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(WHATEVER HAPPENED TO) THE ADA’S “RECORD OF”
PRONG(?)
Alex B. Long*
Abstract: Of the three prongs in the Americans with Disabilities Act’s (ADA) definition
of disability, the “record of” prong is far less likely to be used by ADA plaintiffs in claiming
protection under the Act than are the actual disability and “regarded as” prongs. Between the
years 2000 and 2005, ADA and Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs who alleged employment
discrimination in federal court relied upon the “record of” prong less than one-third as often
as either the actual and “regarded as” prongs in claiming disability status. When they did rely
on the “record of” prong, ADA plaintiffs did not enjoy any greater success during that time
period. Congress, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the federal
courts bear much of the blame for the “record of” prong’s diminished stature. The
requirement of some federal courts that a “record of” plaintiff must actually produce a
tangible record documenting the existence of disability has limited the scope of the second
prong. The U.S. Supreme Court’s restrictive interpretations of the actual and “regarded as”
prongs have also limited the reach of the “record of” disability prong. Congress specifically
intended the “record of” prong to address those situations in which an individual has
recovered from a once-substantially limiting impairment; yet, because of the Court’s
conclusion that an individual’s use of mitigating measures must be taken into account when
assessing the existence of disability, even this use of the “record of” prong is in doubt.
However, in at least some instances, plaintiffs’ attorneys bear some of the blame for the
limited role the “record of” prong plays in employment discrimination suits. This Article
argues that the only way that the “record of” disability prong can play a meaningful role in
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities is if attorneys take a
fresh look at this forgotten portion of the ADA.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1974, the lower half of Evelyn Little’s left leg was amputated as
the result of an accidental shotgun wound.1 It took a year before Little
was fitted with a prosthesis and several years after that before she was
able to walk without a cane.2 According to Little, her impairment was
visible to anyone who saw her walk.3 In 1996, Little applied for a food
service worker position, a position in which she had considerable
experience.4 Over the course of the next three years, she applied for
other vacancies and interviewed with the same employer thirteen more
times; she was rejected each time.5 After being rejected for the
fourteenth time, she filed suit, alleging that she had been discriminated
against on the basis of her disability.6
A Texas trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
employer, and Little appealed. On appeal, the court concluded that,
regardless of whether Little had been discriminated against, she could
not meet the threshold requirement of showing disability status.7 Texas’s
disability discrimination statute, like the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)8 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,9 uses a three-pronged

1. Little v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice (Little I), 147 S.W.3d 421, 422 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003),
rev’d, 148 S.W.3d 374 (Tex. 2004).
2. Id. at 425.
3. Id.
4. See Little v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice (Little II), 148 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Tex. 2004).
5. Little I, 147 S.W.3d at 422.
6. Id. Little’s suit was based on the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, TEX. LAB. CODE
ANN. §§ 21.001–.556 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2004). This statute is parallel to Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102–12111 (2000).
7. Little I, 147 S.W.3d at 425.
8. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
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definition of disability under which a disability may arise from an actual
physical or mental impairment that limits one or more major life
activities, from a record of such an impairment, or from an individual
being regarded as having such an impairment.10 The court concluded that
although Little walked with a slight limp, could not “sit or walk like
other people,” “walk quickly,” or “run at all,” she did not have an actual
disability because her physical impairment did not substantially limit her
in the major life activities of walking or running.11 Turning to the other
prongs in the definition of disability, the court concluded that, despite
Little’s past experience and the employer’s awareness of her
impairment, there was insufficient evidence that the employer regarded
Little as having a disability.12 Finally, despite the fact that Little had
detailed her impairment on her application forms, had been without a leg
for a year, and needed a cane to walk for several years thereafter, the
court concluded that there was insufficient evidence of a record of a
disability.13
The Texas Supreme Court subsequently reversed the trial court’s
decision,14 thus suggesting to the casual observer that the lower court
decisions simply amounted to aberrations. Students of disability law,
however, know better. When viewed against the backdrop of state and
federal disability discrimination case law, Little is hardly an aberration:
studies have repeatedly found the success rate of ADA employment
discrimination plaintiffs to be less than ten percent.15 Little is,
nonetheless, a remarkable case. On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court
reversed on the ground that there was a triable issue of fact over whether
Little had an actual disability.16 The court did not comment on the
plaintiff’s perceived (i.e., “regarded as”) or “record of” disability claims.
At least with respect to Little’s “record of” claim, the court’s failure
to discuss the claim is excusable. Virtually no one discusses such claims
in any detail. Discussion of the “record of” prong in published decisions

9. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
10. Little I, 147 S.W.3d at 424.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 425.
13. Id.
14. Little II, 148 S.W.3d 374, 376 (Tex. 2004).
15. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 99–100 (1999).
16. Little I, 148 S.W.3d at 384.
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rarely involves more than one or two paragraphs of analysis,17 and most
of the voluminous scholarship regarding the ADA’s definition of
disability focuses almost exclusively on the Act’s actual and perceived
disability prongs.18 Perhaps because courts and commentators have
ignored the “record of” prong for so long, no one seems to have noticed
that this prong barely exists in practice anymore.
Indeed, as this Article argues, despite theoretically being on equal
footing with the ADA’s actual disability and “regarded as” prongs, the
“record of” prong is the least debated, least understood, and most poorly
considered portion of Title I of the ADA. It is almost certainly the prong
least likely to be used by employment discrimination plaintiffs in
claiming protection under the Act. Between the years 2000 and 2005,
ADA and Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs in federal court who alleged
employment discrimination were less likely to rely upon the “record of”
prong in claiming disability status than either of the other two prongs.
As Figure 1 illustrates, in reported federal appellate decisions in which
the existence of the plaintiff’s disability was in dispute, a plaintiff’s
disability status under the “record of” prong was, in comparison with the
other two prongs, rarely at issue.19 Disputes about a plaintiff’s eligibility

17. See, e.g., Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 205 (2d Cir. 2004).
18. Some scholarship does, at least in a limited way, address the “record of” disability prong. See,
e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 502–03
(2000). Most scholarship, however, barely mentions the prong. For a representative sample, see
Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition, and “Innocent Mistakes”, 55 VAND.
L. REV. 481, 494 (2002); Chai Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal AntiDiscrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 116–17 (2000); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court’s Definition of
Disability Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 351–55 (2000);
Colker, supra note 15, at 112; Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life
Activities: The Failure of the “Disability” Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
77 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1432 (1999). But see Justin S. Gilbert, Prior History, Present Discrimination,
and the ADA’s “Record of” Disability, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 659 (2001). Gilbert’s article appears to
be the only piece of scholarship dealing primarily with the “record of” disability prong.
19. My research assistant and I conducted Westlaw searches of the database containing reported
federal appellate court decisions, “U.S. Courts of Appeals Cases, Reported (CTAR),” for the years
2000 through 2005. We used “Americans with Disabilities Act” and “Rehabilitation Act” as our
search terms and then used the “locate” function to narrow the search to employment discrimination
cases in which the definition of disability was at issue. We then compiled a list of all such cases,
noting which part or parts of the ADA’s three-part definition of disability were at issue and whether
the plaintiff avoided an unfavorable outcome (e.g., summary judgment) on this specific issue. My
research assistant conducted the initial search, and I read all of the cases the research assistant had
collected and coded to determine their accuracy. I also reproduced my research assistant’s original
search and spot-checked the results in an effort to assure that we had collected all of the relevant
decisions. We chose the year 2000 as the starting point because the U.S. Supreme Court had decided
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under the actual disability or “regarded as” prongs were more than three
times as common on appeal as disputes concerning an individual’s
disability status under the “record of” prong.
Figure 1:

Number of Instances in Reported Federal Appellate
Decisions in Which A Plaintiff’s Disability Status
Was in Dispute20

Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total

Actual
25
33
22
14
13
15
122

Theory of Disability
Record
6
10
4
5
5
4
34

Perceived
19
28
17
19
15
12
110

Is the failure of plaintiffs’ attorneys to utilize the “record of” prong an
example of the bad lawyering that has allegedly plagued litigation under
the ADA,21 or are plaintiffs’ attorneys behaving as rational actors when
a series of cases in 1999 that dealt with the ADA’s definition of disability: Albertson’s, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 520–
22 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999). Thus, 1999 represents a
defining moment in the development of the ADA. Establishing 2000 as the starting point enabled us
to capture the period where the trial and appellate courts began to react to these decisions and
allowed some pending cases to be considered in light of Supreme Court precedent. If an individual’s
disability status was a basis for appeal, but the appellate court decided the case on other grounds
(for example, whether the individual was “qualified”), the decision was included. Excluded were
instances in which an individual did not pursue on appeal a theory of disability coverage that was
pursued at the trial court level. Similarly excluded were instances in which it was impossible from
the appellate court’s decision to tell exactly which of the three prongs of the ADA’s definition of
disability was at issue on appeal. See, e.g., Dolese v. Office Depot, Inc., 231 F.3d 202, 202–03 (5th
Cir. 2000). There are, of course, inherent limitations in relying upon only (a) reported decisions and
(b) reported decisions from federal appellate courts. See Colker, supra note 15, at 104–06
(describing problems). This Article is not intended to be the definitive statistical analysis of ADA
cases in the twenty-first century to date. The decision to rely on reported federal appellate decisions
was made because it was believed that (a) such a limitation would be more likely to screen out
frivolous claims and (b) such a limitation would still yield meaningful results while being easier to
produce.
20. See supra note 19.
21. See Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: Why Are So Many ADA
Plaintiffs Losing Summary Judgment Motions, and Would They Fare Better Before a Jury? A
Response to Professor Colker, 19 REV. LITIG. 505, 515 (2000) (arguing that poor lawyering
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they bypass the “record of” prong? If the outcomes of those cases in
which a plaintiff claims disability status under the “record of” prong are
any indication, it would appear that plaintiffs’ attorneys are behaving
rationally when they choose not to assert coverage under this prong.
Employment discrimination plaintiffs proceeding under Title I of the
ADA have generally enjoyed little success in the years since its
enactment.22 Plaintiffs who proceed under the “record of” prong appear
to be no different. As Figure 2 illustrates, for reported federal appellate
decisions between the years 2000 and 2005, ADA and Rehabilitation
Act plaintiffs who alleged employment discrimination were no more
likely to avoid an unfavorable outcome on a defendant’s challenge as to
the existence of a record of disability than they were with respect to
claims brought under the actual disability and “regarded as” prongs.23

accounts for some of the low success rate of ADA plaintiffs).
22. Colker, supra note 15, at 108–10.
23. This figure reports only those instances in which a plaintiff’s claims were actually addressed
by the appellate court. In some instances, for example, a plaintiff claimed coverage under more than
one prong on appeal, but the court addressed only one prong. See, e.g., Williams v. Toyota Motor
Mfg., Ky., Inc., 224 F.3d 840, 843–44 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). In such cases,
the figure reports only the result for the prong that was addressed; thus, the total number of cases
reported in Figures 1 and 2 are not necessarily the same. A “favorable result” was defined as
avoiding an unfavorable result on the disability question (e.g., avoiding summary judgment,
surviving a motion to dismiss, etc.) as well as victory on the merits of a claim. If a plaintiff obtained
a favorable result on the disability issue, but ultimately lost based on some other factor (e.g.,
whether the individual was “qualified”), the case was counted as a plaintiff “victory” for my
purposes. There are so few reported appellate decisions involving the “record of” prong that it is
difficult to draw any firm conclusions as to plaintiffs’ success rates in comparison to the other two
prongs. In perhaps the most extensive empirical analysis of ADA outcomes, Professor Ruth Colker
found that a plaintiff’s theory of disability “was not a significant factor in predicting appellate
outcome.” Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO
ST. L.J. 239, 271 (2001). It is worth mentioning that Professor Colker’s study did not include cases
decided after 1999; thus, it does not fully reflect the U.S. Supreme Court’s later decisions that
narrowed the scope of the ADA’s definition of disability. These decisions, although dealing with the
other two prongs in the ADA’s definition of disability, could be expected to limit plaintiffs’ success
rates in cases involving the “record of” prong. See infra Parts III.C and III.D.
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Plaintiff Success Rates Depending upon Theory of
Disability24

Year

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total

Favorable Outcomes/Number of Asserted
Claims Per Theory of Disability
Actual
Record
Perceived
5/24
0/4
2/15
7/28
3/7
5/25
5/21
1/4
2/15
2/14
1/4
5/17
4/12
0/4
1/14
5/15
0/4
4/12
28/114
5/27
19/98
(24.6%)
(18.5%)
(19.3%)

This was not how things were supposed to be when the ADA was
enacted. As originally conceived, the “record of” prong had some
promise. It could have been a contender. Many forget that the U.S.
Supreme Court’s first foray into disability discrimination in the
workplace, School Board of Nassau County v. Arline25 in 1987, involved
the “record of” prong. In that case the Court established an extremely
generous standard for qualification under the “record of” prong of the
Rehabilitation Act’s definition of disability.26 Nearly twenty years later,
through a string of restrictive interpretations by the federal courts
involving all three prongs of the ADA’s definition of disability, the
“record of” prong is almost the vestigial definition of discrimination
under the ADA, serving no independent purpose in the eyes of most
ADA plaintiffs.
This Article addresses how we arrived at the present state of affairs.
But the more important question is what can be done to restore to the
“record of” prong to prominence. Congress, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the federal courts bear much of
the blame for the “record of” prong’s diminished stature. However, the
failure of plaintiffs’ attorneys to pursue all available options has also
been a contributing factor to the “record of” prong’s near-comatose
state. This Article argues that the only way that the “record of” prong
24. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
25. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
26. See discussion of Arline, infra notes 155–163 and accompanying text.
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can play a meaningful role in the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities is if attorneys take a fresh look at this
forgotten portion of the ADA.
Part I of this Article describes the “record of” prong’s place within the
ADA’s three-pronged definition of disability and the role Congress
originally envisioned it would play in ending disability discrimination.
Part II discusses the various ways in which the courts, Congress, and the
EEOC have limited the reach of the “record of” disability prong. Part III
argues that the only practical way to inject new life into the “record of”
prong is for plaintiffs’ attorneys to reevaluate this method of establishing
the existence of a disability and to assert coverage under the prong more
often.
I.

THE “RECORD OF” PRONG’S ROLE WITHIN THE ADA’S
DEFINITION OF DISABILITY

While Congress had several possible definitions of “disability” from
which to choose in enacting the ADA, ultimately it chose to employ a
three-pronged approach.27 In theory, each prong has a distinct role to
play in the fight against disability discrimination. This Part discusses
Congress’s conception of the role of the “record of” prong within the
larger definition of disability under the ADA.
A.

The Definition of Disability

The ADA’s definition of disability has its roots in the Rehabilitation
Act Amendments of 1974. Under both the ADA and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act:
the term “disability” means, with respect to an individual—
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.28
For purposes of this Article, there are two particularly noteworthy
aspects of this definition.

27. See Alex Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for Amending the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 625–27 (2004) (describing various pre-ADA state
disability discrimination statutes).
28. Americans with Disabilities Act § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000); Rehabilitation Act, § 504,
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
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The first noteworthy aspect is Congress’s decision to define the
concept of disability in terms of functional limitations. Under the first
prong, the existence of physical or mental impairment, standing alone, is
insufficient to claim disability status. Instead, the impairment must
substantially limit some major life activity, such as walking, hearing, or
breathing.29 This functional approach toward defining disability
represented a departure from traditional approaches, which had defined
the concept in medical or occupational terms.30
The other noteworthy feature of the definition is the congressional
decision to use the actual disability definition of 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2)(A) (the codification of Section 3(2)(A) of the ADA) as the
anchor for the other two prongs. Both the “record of” and “regarded as”
prongs derive their meaning from the actual disability definition. In
order to have a record of disability, for example, the statute provides that
the individual must have a record of “such an impairment,” i.e., an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. Thus, the
“record of” and “regarded as” prongs will inevitably force the finder of
fact back to the actual disability prong in order to assess whether an
individual has a disability.31
This decision to link the three definitions of disability by reference to
the actual disability definition had at least two important consequences.
First, it meant that any judicial interpretation of the actual disability
prong would have ripple effects for the second and third prongs. For
example, years later when the U.S. Supreme Court would hold that the
terms in the ADA’s definition of an actual disability must be interpreted
strictly in order to create a “demanding standard for qualifying as
disabled,”32 plaintiffs proceeding under the “record of” prong would
theoretically face the same “demanding standard.” Second, by
inextricably linking the three prongs together by reference to the first,
Congress weakened the move toward a civil rights model of disability
with respect to the second and third prongs. In keeping with the
approach of other anti-discrimination laws, the inclusion of the second
and third prongs represents a recognition on Congress’s part that societal
attitudes about disability may be as limiting as the actual effects of an

29. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2006).
30. Long, supra note 27, at 603–05.
31. Eichhorn, supra note 18, at 1432.
32. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
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impairment.33 However, the linkage with the actual disability prong
suggests an unwillingness to completely abandon the inquiry into
functional limitations and throw open the door to individuals who have
been discriminated against on the basis of some relatively minor
impairment or personal characteristic.34
B.

The “Record of” Prong’s Role in the Three-Pronged Approach to
Disability

As Section 504 case law developed and as Congress was considering
the ADA, it was widely assumed that the three prongs in the ADA’s
definition of disability each served different functions. The actual
disability prong has the closest connection to the ADA’s reasonable
accommodation requirement, which requires that employers make
reasonable modifications or adjustments to the way work is ordinarily
performed or to the workplace itself so that individuals with disabilities
can perform the essential functions of a job.35 Under the Act, an
individual with a disability must be qualified before he or she is entitled
to the protection of the Act.36 A qualified individual with a disability is
one who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the position the individual holds or desires.37 Thus,
the reasonable accommodation requirement is a device that helps
remove the obstacles that prevent individuals with disabilities from
participating fully in the workplace.38 An individual who cannot perform
the essential functions of a position, even with reasonable
accommodation, is not qualified and is not entitled to the ADA’s
protection. Thus, the actual disability prong is typically thought of as
applying to the individual who has an impairment that limits his or her
ability to perform a job, but who would be capable of performing the job
if the employer would make modest or relatively inexpensive

33. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284–86 (1987).
34. See Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 1997) (“It would be inconsistent
with [the] purposes [of the Acts] to construe the acts to reach alleged discrimination by an employer
on the basis of a simple physical characteristic, such as weight.”).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2006).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
37. Id. § 12111(8).
38. See Jeffrey O. Cooper, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: The Trials of
Textualism and the Practical Limits of Practical Reason, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1228 (2000).
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modifications, such as modifying work schedules or purchasing special
equipment or devices.39
Congress, however, recognized that not all discrimination would
involve disparate treatment on the basis of an actual disability, hence the
inclusion of the “record of” and “regarded as” prongs. The “regarded as”
prong was originally seen as the catch-all prong, which could be used as
a fall back where a plaintiff could not establish the existence of an actual
disability or a record thereof.40 However, it was also the prong most
commonly associated with one particular form of discrimination:
discrimination resulting from society’s “accumulated myths and fears
about disability and disease,” particularly with respect to those
individuals especially vulnerable to discrimination because they suffer
from stigmatized conditions .41 Even where an employer is not basing its
decisions on myths, fears, and stereotypes, it may, based on faulty
information or faulty information-processing, view an individual’s
impairment as being more limiting than it actually is.42 Thus, the
legislative history of the ADA indicates that the perceived disability
prong was designed to cover those individuals who (1) have a physical
or mental impairment that does not substantially limit a major life
activity, but who are treated by a covered entity as having such a
limitation, (2) have a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits a major activity only as a result of the attitudes of others toward

39. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Pendo, Substantially Limited Justice?: The Possibilities and Limits of a
New Rawlsian Analysis of Disability-Based Discrimination, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 225, 254 (2003).
40. Feldblum, supra note 18, at 141; Risa M. Mish, Essay, “Regarded as Disabled” Claims
Under the ADA: Safety Net or Catch-All?, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 159, 160 (1998); Arlene B.
Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the “Regarded as” Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent,
42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 609 (1997).
41. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l)
(2006) (discussing the “regarded as” prong in the context of “myths, fears, and stereotypes”); H.R.
REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 53 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 335 (stating that the
“regarded as” prong of the ADA’s disability definition “is particularly important for individuals
with stigmatic conditions that are viewed as physical impairments but do not in fact result in a
substantial limitation of a major life activity”). Much of the scholarship produced shortly after the
passage of the ADA drew a link between the “regarded as” prong and conditions associated with
social stigma. See, e.g., Wendy K. Voss, Note, Employing the Alcoholic under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 895, 912 (1992) (assuming that an individual with a
condition to which a social stigma attaches would be covered under the “regarded as” prong).
42. See Cornman v. N.P. Dodge Mgmt. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1071 (D. Minn. 1999)
(suggesting that a plaintiff would be covered under the “regarded as” prong where the employer
perceives plaintiff as suffering from a more severe impairment or being more limited in her life
activities than she actually was).
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the impairment, and (3) have no physical or mental impairment but are
treated by a covered entity as having such an impairment.43
The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974
suggests that the purpose of the “record of” prong is to protect
individuals who have been “classified or labeled, correctly or
incorrectly, as handicapped.”44 At first glance, this language from the
report of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee would seem to
indicate that the distinguishing characteristic of individuals falling under
the second prong is the existence of some type of tangible record that
contains the classification or label of a disability. In the case of
individuals who have incorrectly been labeled with a disability, for
example, the misclassification would mostly likely be found in a
document of some kind. However, a closer examination of the
committee report reveals that the desire to protect individuals with a
history of disability was at least as strong a motivation. According to the
report, the protection of the “record of” prong extends to “persons who
have recovered—in whole or in part—from a handicapping condition,
such as a mental or neurological illness, a heart attack, or cancer and to
persons who were classified as handicapped (for example, as mentally ill
or mentally retarded) . . . .”45
The legislative history of the ADA suggests that Congress devoted far
less thought to the “record of” prong’s place within the ADA’s tripartite
definition of disability than it did to the other two prongs. In comparison
with the House Education and Labor Committee’s discussion of the
actual disability and “regarded as” prongs, the discussion of the “record
of” prong is remarkably short.46 However, what little legislative history
exists concerning the prong is consistent with the legislative history of
the Rehabilitation Act. The ADA’s legislative history re-emphasized the
two basic purposes of the second prong contained in the Rehabilitation
Act Amendment’s legislative history: to protect those individuals “who
ha[ve] a history of, or [have] been misclassified as having, a mental or
physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
43. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 53 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 335.
44. S. REP. NO. 93-1297, at 38–39 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6389.
45. Id.
46. In one section devoted to the purposes and intended operation of the three prongs, the report
devotes at least a page each to both the actual and “regarded as” disability prongs. In contrast, the
report devotes a whopping four sentences, totaling under 150 words, to describe the purpose and
intended operation of the “record of” disability prong. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 51–54 (1990),
as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333–36.

681

LONG

11/5/2006 1:09:07 PM

Washington Law Review

Vol. 81:669, 2006

activities.”47 This same theme was also carried over in the EEOC’s
Interpretive Guidance to the ADA.48 In describing the concept of a
“history” of such an impairment, the legislative history is clear that it is
referring to a past, not necessarily recorded, history of such an
impairment.49 Thus, the “record of” prong was designed in part “to
protect individuals who have recovered from a physical or mental
impairment which previously substantially limited them in a major life
activity.”50
C.

The “Record of” Prong’s Role in Protecting Individuals Who Have
Been Misclassified as Having a Disability or Who Have Recovered
From a Disability

Discrimination against individuals with disabilities occurs in many
ways. In some instances, the “record of” and “regarded as” prongs
address the same forms of discrimination. But, at least in theory, there
are limited situations in which the “record of” prong might have an
independent role to play in the fight against disability discrimination.
1.

Irrational Discrimination and the “Record of” Prong

An individual who has been misclassified as having an impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity or who has recovered from
such an impairment might need protection from employment
discrimination for several reasons. First and most obviously, the “record
of” prong would seem to play a role in the case of truly irrational
discrimination based on the stigma associated with some impairments.
Individuals who have a history of disability or who have been
misclassified as having such a condition may continue to carry a stigma
with them throughout their employment life and remain vulnerable to
irrational employer discrimination. For example, an individual who was
once institutionalized with a mental impairment carries that stigma with
her when she applies for a job and is vulnerable to any fears or
discomfort her employer may have about mental illness.51 Individuals
47. Id. at 52, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 334.
48. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k) (2006).
49. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 52 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334
(emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. Cf. Allen v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 64, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that, in the context of a “record
of” disability claim, the handicap facing former institutionalized patients is the stigma of being a
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who have been misclassified as having certain physical impairments,
such as cancer, may likewise need protection from the same type of
irrational fears by employers.52
As others have noted, there is considerable overlap between the
“record of” and “regarded as” prongs in terms of addressing irrational
discrimination.53 Protection from irrational discrimination based upon
the fears and stigmas associated with certain conditions is most
frequently described as being the purpose of the “regarded as” prong.54
Indeed, the ADA’s legislative history specifically mentions that
individuals with stigmatic conditions are covered under the perceived
disability prong, but makes no explicit mention of coverage for these
individuals under the “record of” prong.55
Despite this omission, the fact that Congress used the ADA to place
limitations on the ability of employers to require medical examinations
or inquire into the medical histories of job applicants and employees
supports the conclusion that the “record of” prong was meant to serve at
least some role in protecting individuals with conditions associated with
stigma. The ADA establishes three stages that determine when and
under what circumstances an employer may delve into the medical
history of an individual. Before extending a job offer, an employer may
ask questions about an applicant’s ability to perform job-related
functions, but is prohibited from making disability-related inquiries or
requiring medical examinations.56 After the employer has made a
conditional job offer, it may make medical inquiries or require medical
examinations, but only if the same is required of all individuals in that
job category.57 Finally, after an individual starts work, an employer may

former psychiatric patient); see also Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 21 (1st
Cir. 2002) (stating that “a person is disabled if she . . . is stigmatized by a ‘record of such an
impairment’”); Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that
the “record of” disability prong “would include people who have recovered from previously
disabling conditions (cancer or coronary disease, for example) but who may remain vulnerable to
the fears and stereotypes of their employers”).
52. Davidson, 133 F.3d at 509.
53. Id. (stating that the “record of” prong “is a close sibling to the ‘perceived impairment’”
claim); Bagenstos, supra note 18, at 433 (noting the similar ideas that underlie both prongs); Pendo,
supra note 39, at 247 (pointing to the “record of” and “regarded as” prongs as evidence “that the
ADA seeks to prohibit discrimination on the basis of stereotype, stigma, and myth”).
54. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
55. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 53 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 335.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (2000).
57. Id. § 12112(d)(3).
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only make such inquires or require such examinations if they are jobrelated and consistent with business necessity.58
The restrictions on medical examinations and inquiries reflect, in part,
a congressional concern about irrational discrimination stemming from
an employer’s reliance on an individual’s medical history.59 The House
Education and Labor Committee report noted that “there still exists
widespread irrational prejudice against persons with cancer.”60 Thus, “if
an employee starts to lose a significant amount of hair, the employer
should not be able to require the person to be tested for cancer unless
such testing is job-related.”61 Similarly, to use an example from the
legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, an
employer might base its decision on the stigma associated with being
“mentally ill.”62 Thus, the restrictions on the ability of employers to
delve into the history of job applicants and employees may be seen, in
part, as an attempt to prevent employers from learning about an
individual’s past history of a condition associated with stigma.
2.

Rational but Uninformed Discrimination, Stereotypical Thinking,
and the “Record of” Prong

The “record of” prong would also seem to play an important role in
addressing rational but uninformed employer discrimination. In such a
situation, an employer might base its decisions on sweeping
generalizations about certain impairments that are completely untrue (“It
might cost me more money in the long run to employ you since cancer is
contagious.”). Conversely, the employer might make sweeping
generalizations that are true about some, but not all, individuals with the
impairment in question (“I don’t want to hire you since people with
diabetes can’t work long hours.”).63 Thus, an individual who still has an
impairment, but who has recovered to the point that the impairment no
58. Id. § 12112(d)(4).
59. See Chai Feldblum, Medical Examinations and Inquiries Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: A View from the Inside, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 521, 536 (1991) (explaining that the
motivation for an earlier version of the restriction on medical inquires and examinations was “to
prohibit employers from inquiring into particular disabilities, such as HIV infection, which pose a
social stigma simply by identification, but have no relevance to the person’s ability to perform the
job”).
60. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (II), at 75 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 357–58.
61. Id., as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 357.
62. S. REP. NO. 93-1297 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6390.
63. See Travis, supra note 18, at 485.
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longer substantially limits her, might be vulnerable to these types of
uninformed judgments. Similarly, an individual who has been
misclassified as having an impairment might be vulnerable to the same
misconceptions.
Once again, addressing stereotypical assumptions that are not truly
indicative of an individual’s ability is typically thought of as the domain
of the perceived disability prong.64 However, the legislative history
surrounding the ADA’s restrictions on medical examinations and
inquiries also supports the view that the “record of” prong might have
some role to play in such instances. The legislative history explains that
the purpose of the ADA’s prohibitions on pre-offer inquiries and
medical examinations is “to assure that misconceptions do not bias the
employment selection process.”65 A typical employer “misconception”
might be the rational, but stereotypical, notion that all individuals with
certain kinds of conditions would be unable to perform the functions of
the position in question.66 Therefore, Congress was understandably
concerned that employers would rely on medical histories and records to
deny an individual employment “before their ability to perform the job
was even evaluated.”67
3.

Rational but Misinformed Discrimination/Innocent Mistakes and
the “Record of” Prong

The “record of” prong might also play a role where an employer was
misinformed about the extent or existence of an individual’s impairment,
but acted rationally based on that misinformation. A perfect example of
a situation in which an employer might make such an “innocent
mistake”68 is the case of an individual who has been misclassified as
being mentally retarded and who is denied employment as a result of an
employer’s rational belief that the individual lacks the mental capacity to
perform the essential functions of the position in question. According to
64. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (2006) (discussing the purpose of the perceived disability
prong as to address employer “myths, fears, and stereotypes”); Travis, supra note 18, at 485
(discussing employer generalizations in the context of the “regarded as” prong).
65. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (II), at 72 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 355.
66. Travis, supra note 18, at 485.
67. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (II), at 72, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 355; see also U.S
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE
EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § I-5.5 (1992)
[hereinafter EEOC MANUAL] (repeating the same concern).
68. Travis, supra note 18, at 486.
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the ADA’s legislative history, such an individual is part of the “record
of” prong’s intended class.69
4.

Rational Discrimination Stemming from Attitudinal Barriers and
the “Record of” Prong

Alternatively, an employer might engage in a different form of
rational, but still exclusionary conduct. Take the case of an individual
who has been misclassified as having an impairment or who has largely,
but not fully recovered from a once-disabling impairment. The employer
might conclude that it does not wish to hire the individual because the
individual may require some type of accommodation which the
employer would prefer not to make.70 Alternatively, the employer might
decline to hire the individual because it rationally (or even correctly)
believes that although the individual is not substantially limited in a
major life activity, the individual nonetheless remains somewhat limited
and will have decreased productivity or might cause an increase in the
employer’s insurance or workers’ compensation costs. In theory, this
would seem to be a situation in which the “record of” prong would cover
an individual who would fit under neither the actual disability prong nor
the “regarded as” prong. The employer in such an instance would not be
basing its decision on the belief that the individual was substantially
limited, the negative reactions of others, or the stereotypical thinking one
might naturally associate with perceived disabilities. Instead, the
discrimination would result from a different type of attitudinal barrier on
the part of the employer.71

69. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
70. See Travis, supra note 18, at 486.
71. Interestingly, the report of the House Judiciary Committee viewed these types of attitudinal
barriers as being particularly within the province of the “regarded as” prong. According to the
report, “concerns regarding productivity, safety, insurance, liability, attendance, cost of
accommodation and accessibility, and acceptance by co-workers and customers” are the “attitudinal
barriers that Congress clearly intended to include within the meaning of ‘regarded as’ having a
disability under the Rehabilitation Act and now under the ADA.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (III), at 30
(1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453; Travis, supra note 18, at 486 (explaining that
the perceived disability prong covers this type of rational discrimination); see also Downs v. Mass.
Bay Transp. Auth., 13 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 1998) (involving “regarded as” claim where
employer was aware of plaintiff’s past impairments and receipt of workers’ compensation benefits
and allegedly acted out of concern over increased workers’ compensation costs). There is no
corresponding statement regarding the purposes of the “record of” prong.
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5.

Rational but Speculative Discrimination and the “Record of”
Prong

A final situation in which the “record of” prong might play some type
of role, independent from the “regarded as” prong, is the situation in
which the employer’s discrimination is rational but speculative in nature.
An example of rational but speculative discrimination might involve an
individual whose cancer has gone into remission.72 An employer who
discovers the individual’s history of cancer during a review of the
individual’s medical records might regard the individual as having a
propensity for relapse or being more prone to cancer.73 Because the
employer would be basing any adverse decision on unscientific
judgments about the possibility of relapse of cancer or on the potential
costs associated with a possible relapse, the situation would seem to call
for a perceived disability analysis.74 However, a perception that an
individual has a propensity to develop an impairment is not the same
thing as a perception of an impairment.75 Thus, as several decisions
attest, the employer might not regard the individual as having an
impairment that substantially limits the individual in a major life activity
and the individual might not be covered under the “regarded as” prong.76
Because the individual would not have a current disability or be
regarded as having a disability, the only option would be to claim
protection under the “record of” prong based on a history of disability.77
72. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (II), at 52–53 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334.
73. Cf. Cornman v. N.P. Dodge Mgmt. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1071 (D. Minn. 1999)
(involving this fact pattern).
74. See Stokes v. Hamilton County, 113 F. App’x 680, 684 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal in
favor of an employer who feared employee’s cancer might relapse and result in future expenses for
employer because the employer’s decision was allegedly made on the basis of financial concerns,
not the perception that employee would be substantially limited); see also MASS. COMM’N AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION, GUIDELINES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP—CH.
151B, §10(c)(1), http://www.mass.gov/mcad/disability4.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2006)
(“Unjustified concern regarding a potential relapse into drug use may indicate that the employer
regards the employee as addicted (handicapped).”).
75. Cornman, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)).
76. Id. at 1071; see also Conant v. City of Hibbing, 271 F.3d 782, 786 (8th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that employer did not perceive plaintiff as having a disability simply because it
perceived him as likely to develop a medical condition in the future); Stokes, 113 F. App’x at 684
(concluding that employer did not regard plaintiff as having a disability where employer allegedly
was concerned that plaintiff’s cancer would relapse and result in future expenses, not that plaintiff
would be substantially limited in his ability to work).
77. Cornman, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1073 (finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff
in this fact pattern had a record of disability).

687

LONG

11/5/2006 1:09:07 PM

Washington Law Review

Vol. 81:669, 2006

In sum, the “record of” prong theoretically has a distinct role to play
in addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities. In
some instances, individuals who have a history of disability or have been
misclassified as having a disability may already fall under the ADA’s
“regarded as” prong. However, in other instances, the “record of” prong
may be the only viable option for a plaintiff.
II.

WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE ADA’S “RECORD OF”
PRONG?

As the preceding Part illustrated, the “record of” prong might serve
several possible roles in addressing employment discrimination against
individuals with histories of disability. Yet, as most employment lawyers
instinctively know, ADA plaintiffs rarely utilize the second prong in
practice and succeed under the prong even less frequently. The
following Part explains how the federal courts’ restrictive interpretations
of the ADA’s definition of an actual disability and the analytical
shortcomings associated with the “record of” prong have created the
current state of affairs. Specifically, it addresses situations involving
individuals who have been misclassified with a disability; the
requirement that a plaintiff must establish that an employer relied on
records documenting the existence of a disability in order to fit under the
“record of” prong; and several of the interpretive rules regarding the
ADA’s definition of disability and their effect on the interpretation of
the “record of” prong.
A.

The “Record of” Prong’s Purpose in Addressing Discrimination
Against Individuals Who Have Been Misclassified with a Disability
(to the Extent Any Such Individuals Actually Exist)

As discussed, Congress viewed the second prong as covering two
distinct groups of individuals: those with a history of disability and those
who have been misclassified with a disability.78 The fate of individuals
misclassified with a disability under the “record of” prong can be
dispensed with quite quickly. While those who have been misclassified
as having a disability are certainly in need of protection from
employment discrimination, the reality is that there have been virtually
no such reported cases under either the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.79
78. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.
79. One of the few reported cases involving a misclassification situation involved a group of
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Perhaps the absence of cases has resulted because misclassification is
(hopefully) relatively rare to begin with. Perhaps it has something to do
with the fact that the ADA generally prohibits medical examinations and
disability-related questions during the interview process,80 thus limiting
employers’ access to employee medical records.
Regardless, misclassification cases involving job applicants or
employees are so uncommon as to be virtually non-existent. As such, the
purpose and practical effect of the second prong in addressing
employment discrimination in these types of cases is largely theoretical.
Instead, it is cases involving the first group of individuals, those who
have a history of once-substantially limiting impairment, that have
generated the most case law—and confusion—regarding the “record of”
prong.
B.

The Reliance and Documentation Requirement

One feature of the “record of” prong that limits its overall reach is the
requirement of some courts that an employer rely on some type of actual
documentation of a past impairment. According to the EEOC, in order to
satisfy the “record of” prong, a plaintiff must establish that, in making
the employment decision, the employer relied on a record indicating that
the plaintiff has or had a substantially limiting impairment.81 When
discussing a “record” of disability, it is clear the EEOC is referring to
tangible documents such as “education, medical, or employment
records.”82 Therefore, under the EEOC’s approach, it is insufficient for a
plaintiff to simply demonstrate that she has recovered from a oncesubstantially limiting impairment in order to fall within the “record of”
prong. Nor, presumably, is it sufficient that the employer had
independent knowledge of the fact that the individual once had a
disability.83 Instead, the plaintiff must establish that the adverse
employment decision was dependent on some type of tangible

students who had been misclassified by a school district as being mentally retarded. Anderson v.
Banks, 520 F. Supp. 472 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
80. See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text.
81. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k) (2006); EEOC MANUAL, supra note 67, § I-2.2(b).
82. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k).
83. Crock v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1120 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (“It does not
matter whether Graft knew Crock had an impairment or not because mere knowledge of a physical
or mental impairment is not enough to show that Crock has a history of a disability nor does it
create a record of an impairment.”).
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document. Several courts have likewise taken this approach.84 This
requirement is noteworthy in several respects.
First, the idea that an employer must rely upon a tangible record of
such history in order for a plaintiff to satisfy the threshold question as to
the existence of a disability is not mentioned in any of the committee
reports accompanying the Rehabilitation Act Amendments or the ADA.
Nor was it mentioned in the original regulations promulgated under the
Rehabilitation Act by the Department of Health & Human Services.85
Instead, these sources discuss the concept of a “history” of a disability
almost solely in the sense of a past condition that is no longer
substantially limiting.86 Several early Rehabilitation Act cases
approached the issue in much the same way, relying upon a plaintiff’s
prior history, rather than an employer’s knowledge of that history
derived from reviewing documentation, as the basis for concluding that
an individual had a record of disability.87 And while Congress’s

84. This approach is the announced position of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Taylor v.
Nimock’s Oil Co., 214 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 2000) (“In order to have a record of a disability, an
employee’s ‘documentation must show’ that she has a history of or has been subject to
misclassification as disabled.” (internal citations omitted) (citing Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d
907, 915 (8th Cir. 1999))). Other courts have emphasized heavily the absence of documentation in
their rulings against plaintiffs who have relied on the second prong. See Ellison v. Software
Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that plaintiff did not have a record of
disability, despite the fact employer was aware of plaintiff’s condition, because nothing in
employee’s personnel file indicated that plaintiff had a disability); Roberts v. Rayonier, Inc., 326 F.
Supp. 2d 1323, 1332 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (“A person has a record of a disability if a record relied upon
by an employer indicates that the individual has or had a substantially limiting impairment.”
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Couts v. Beaulieu Group, LLC, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1305
(N.D. Ga. 2003))); Campbell v. Prince George’s County Md., No. Civ.A. AW-99-87, 2001 WL
21257, at *4 (D. Md. Jan. 4, 2001) (concluding that plaintiff who had undergone a liver transplant
and required medication in order for her liver to function effectively did not have a record of
disability because she did not list her liver transplant on her employment application form); Stone v.
Sangamon County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 168 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (C.D. Ill. 2001) (concluding that
plaintiff’s failure to introduce a medical record of his disability was fatal to his “record of” claim);
Skinner v. Atl. Marine Corp., No. Civ.A. 96-0622-AH-S, 1997 WL 602446, at *5 (S.D. Ala. June
23, 1997) (concluding that the fact that co-workers were aware of plaintiff’s coronary problems and
surgery was insufficient to establish a record of disability, especially where the plaintiff’s
impairment did not qualify as an actual disability).
85. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iii) (1978); id. app. A.
86. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (II), at 52 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
334 (“This provision is included in the definition in part to protect individuals who have recovered
from a physical or mental impairment which previously substantially limited them in a major life
activity.”).
87. In Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981), for example, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that an individual had a record of disability based upon her history of
psychiatric problems. The court reached this conclusion despite the fact the individual had denied
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prohibitions on pre-employment medical examinations and inquiries
certainly evince a concern that documented disabilities might have
adverse consequences for an individual’s employment prospects, the
restrictions also implicitly demonstrate a concern over the consequences
from an employer learning, from whatever source, about an individual’s
current or past history of an impairment.
In addition, the EEOC approach requires an ADA plaintiff to
establish that the employer relied upon a record in reaching its decision
in order to obtain coverage under the second prong. One important
practical implication of this approach is that it turns the threshold
question as to the existence of a disability into a question of causation.88
For example, according to the EEOC’s Technical Assistance Manual,
“[i]f an employer relies on any record . . . containing . . . information
[about a disability] to make an adverse employment decision about a
person who currently is qualified to perform a job, the action is subject
to challenge.”89 It is clear from this statement that the EEOC views the
concept of an employer’s reliance as being directly related to an
employer’s motivation. Any discrimination plaintiff must, of course,
prove that the plaintiff’s characteristic was the cause of the employer’s
adverse decision, and the ADA specifically provides that it is illegal to
discriminate against a qualified individual “because of the disability of
such individual.”90 Therefore, as part of a prima facie case, any plaintiff,
regardless of the theory of discrimination, has to establish that the
employer actually knew or believed that the plaintiff possessed the trait
in question.91 Plaintiffs proceeding under the ADA’s “record of” prong
should be no different.92 However, there is a fundamental distinction
between requiring plaintiffs to establish that they possess a particular
trait and requiring them to prove that such a trait made a difference to
the employer.93 The latter requirement imposes an additional hurdle at
the existence of any such problems on her application forms. Id.; see also Allen v. Heckler, 780
F.2d 64, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasizing that plaintiff was covered under the second prong
because of her history of disability); Mahoney v. Ortiz, 645 F. Supp. 22, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(concluding that plaintiff fit under the second prong because “he has a history” of shoulder
dislocations).
88. Gilbert, supra note 18, at 666–67.
89. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 67, § I-2.2(b).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
91. See, e.g., Lubetsky v. Applied Card Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2002).
92. See Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that to
discriminate against someone because of a disability requires knowledge of the disability).
93. See Pace v. Paris Maint. Co., 107 F. Supp. 2d 251, 261 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (declining to
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the preliminary stage of establishing the existence of the trait in question
that has no parallel in employment discrimination law.
This blurring of the distinction between the plaintiff’s protected
characteristic and the defendant’s mental state is not necessarily limited
to the “record of” prong. By making an individual’s qualification for
protected class treatment contingent on a defendant’s perceptions, the
“regarded as” prong likewise tends to blend the two analyses into the
same inquiry.94 However, the reliance requirement that the EEOC has
imported into the “record of” prong comes much closer to completely
obliterating the distinction than do the requirements of the “regarded as”
prong because “reliance” necessarily presumes “dependence.” Indeed,
the reliance requirement may impose an even greater burden on “record
of” plaintiffs than perceived disability plaintiffs if the “record” upon
which the employer relies must be an actual, tangible document of some
kind rather than the more generalized type of knowledge or belief on the
part of an employer that is sufficient to establish coverage under the
perceived disability prong.95
One likely consequence of the requirement that an employer must rely
on a tangible document in order to satisfy the prerequisites of the second
prong is that the passage of time or the absence of resources will prevent
at least some individuals from claiming coverage. For example, in Little,
the case described in the Introduction of this Article, more than 20 years
had elapsed from the time of the plaintiff’s injury to the time she applied
for employment.96 Perhaps not surprisingly, the plaintiff failed to
produce any medical records documenting her amputation or the
subsequent limitations imposed by the amputation.97 As a practical
matter then, if a court requires an actual record of disability in order for
a plaintiff to claim the protection of the “record of” prong, it may be that

adopt a reliance requirement as a prerequisite for coverage under the second prong, but noting the
need for plaintiffs to establish knowledge on the part of the defendant in order to establish a prima
facie case).
94. Compare Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701, 708–09 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that
evidence that employer’s stated reason for taking adverse action against individual was pretextual
may be used to support individual’s contention that employer regarded the individual as being
disabled) with Rakity v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 302 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the Ross
approach on the grounds that it would collapse the distinction between the prima facie case and the
pretext stages of such cases).
95. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
96. Little I, 147 S.W.3d 421, 422 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003), rev’d, 148 S.W.3d 374 (Tex. 2004).
97. Id. at 425.
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some plaintiffs with legitimate claims are denied coverage simply
because the records no longer exist or cannot be located.98
In addition, as privacy concerns drive the current trend toward
increased statutory restrictions on the disclosure of medical records, it
may make it less likely in the near future that employers will be in
possession of medical histories concerning their job applicants.
Recognition that a breach of an individual’s medical privacy could have
dramatic consequences, including an adverse effect on future
employment prospects,99 helped spur the privacy provisions of the
Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act (HIPAA).100 Under
HIPAA, a health plan, health care clearinghouse, or health care provider
may generally only disclose protected health information with the
consent of the individual.101 Thus, at least at the pre-offer stage, an
employer is increasingly unlikely to have significant medical
documentation concerning its job applicants.
Finally, the ADA’s own provisions limiting the ability of employers
to inquire into the medical histories of job applicants and employees and
to require applicants and employees to undergo medical examinations
also limit the number of instances in which employers will be in
possession of records documenting the existence of a disability. If, for
example, employers are prohibited from asking questions of job
applicants that are likely to elicit information about a disability,102 the
number of instances in which employers should have records detailing
historical conditions from which their job applicants have recovered
should be fairly limited. Thus, the EEOC’s documentation requirement
has the perverse effect of actually making it more difficult for ADA
plaintiffs to establish coverage under the “record of” prong.

98. See Pace, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 260–61 (refusing to require medical evidence of a history of
disability, in part, on the theory that such a requirement could force dismissal of legitimate claims).
99. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,468 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 160 & 164 (2006)).
100. Pub. L. No. 104-91, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 201 (1996)).
101. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103, 164.502 (2006).
102. EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL
EXAMINATIONS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
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The Individualized Inquiry Rule

Another important consequence of the documentation requirement
involves how the requirement can interact with the U.S. Supreme
Court’s instruction that the ADA’s definition of disability requires an
individualized inquiry. This individualized inquiry rule has generally
made it more difficult for ADA plaintiffs to claim protection under the
statute. In several instances, the rule has also imposed a significant
burden on plaintiffs proceeding under the “record of” prong.
1.

A Diagnosis of an Impairment Doth Not a Record of Disability
Make: The Individualized Inquiry Rule

a.

Per Se Disabilities and the “Record of” Prong

One of the supposed benefits of the ADA’s definition of disability
was that it would require courts and employers to look beyond the mere
fact that an individual had a physical or mental impairment and look
instead at the functional limitations to that individual stemming from the
impairment.103 By defining an actual disability in terms of an individual
and whether the individual’s impairment substantially limited a major
life activity, ADA proponents believed the definition would limit the
ability of employers to make blanket generalizations concerning certain
types of impairments.104 In short, employers would have to look at the
individual, rather than simply the fact of his or her impairment.
Accordingly, the statutory definition of an individual with a disability
seemed to reject the concept that certain impairments were per se
disabilities.105
The legislative history of the Act, however, presents a more confusing
picture of the concept of disability. Various portions of the legislative
history seem to indicate that Congress believed certain types of
impairment would almost always constitute actual disabilities. As
examples, the House Education and Labor Committee report cited
individuals who are paraplegic, deaf, have a lung disease, and who are

103. See infra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing the congressional intent to eliminate
“reflexive reactions” to impairments).
104. Ann Hubbard, Understanding and Implementing the ADA’s Direct Threat Defense, 95 NW.
U. L. REV. 1279, 1306 (2001).
105. See id.
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infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).106 Even with
respect to these individuals, however, the report explains that such
individuals would be considered to have disabilities by virtue of the fact
that their impairments substantially limited certain major life activities
(walking, hearing, breathing, and procreation and intimate sexual
relations, respectively).107 In the section concerning prohibited medical
inquiries and examinations, the committee report again seems to view
certain conditions as being almost per se disabilities, referring to
“epilepsy, diabetes, emotional illness, heart disease and cancer” as the
types of “hidden disabilities” of which employers were often cautious.108
But, in other portions of the legislative history, Congress reiterated what
appears to be the plain meaning of the statutory definition of an actual
disability: “A physical or mental impairment does not constitute a
disability under the first prong of the definition for purposes of the ADA
unless its severity is such that it results in a ‘substantial limitation of one
or more major life activities.’”109
Nowhere is the confusion over whether certain impairments could
constitute per se disabilities more evident than with respect to
Congress’s treatment of the “record of” prong. By defining the coverage
of the second prong by reference to the actual disability definition,
Congress directed courts back to the question of whether the impairment
from which the plaintiff had recovered or with which she had been
misclassified substantially limited a major life activity.110 Thus, one
cannot make the determination that an individual has a record of
disability without first reaching the conclusion that the documented or
historical disability once substantially limited the individual in a major
life activity. The problem, at least with respect to the “record of” prong,
is that Congress does not necessarily appear to have viewed the prong as
operating in this manner.
For instance, the legislative histories of the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1974 and the ADA indicate that Congress assumed that
individuals who were classified as being “mentally ill or mentally
retarded” would be covered under the second prong.111 In other words,

106. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (II), at 52 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 72, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 355.
109. Id. at 52, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 334.
110. See supra notes 106–109 and accompanying text.
111. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (II), at 52–53, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334–35.
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Congress either viewed mental illness and mental retardation as per se
disabilities or as impairments that would almost always substantially
limit an individual in a major life activity. Mental illness and mental
retardation are certainly impairments.112 However, if one takes the time
to inquire whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity by the impairments, there is no guarantee that either condition
will rise to the level of a disability in a given case. Indeed, ADA case
law that has taken such an individualized approach confirms this fact.113
This somewhat contradictory approach to classifying impairments as
disabilities continued when the EEOC promulgated its Technical
Guidance (the Guidance). In those portions of the Guidance dealing with
actual disabilities, the EEOC fairly consistently takes a case-by-case
approach toward determining whether an impairment rises to the level of
a disability.114 According to the Guidance, “[t]he determination of
whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the
name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the
effect of that impairment on the life of the individual.”115 Yet when
discussing coverage under the “record of” prong, the EEOC almost as
clearly takes the position that a diagnosis of certain types of impairments
does in fact establish the existence of a disability. According to the
Guidance, “[t]he impairment indicated in the record must be an
impairment that would substantially limit one or more of the individual’s
major life activities.”116 The inclusion of the word “would” suggests a
hypothetical inquiry surrounding the general nature of an impairment,
not an actual description in the record of how the impairment actually
once substantially limited a major life activity.
In discussing the “record of” prong’s scope in its Technical Guidance,
the EEOC simply assumed in several examples that the impairments it
described would substantially limit an individual’s major life
activities.117 For example, “[a] job applicant was hospitalized for

112. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2006).
113. See Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 350, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding
that an individual with bipolar disorder did not have a disability); Anderson v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
No. 97-3388, 1999 WL 240242, at *2 (10th Cir. Apr. 20, 1999) (holding that an individual with
mild mental retardation did not have a disability).
114. Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice: How Individualizing
the Determination of “Disability” Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL. L. REV. 327, 338–39 (1997).
115. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (2006) (emphasis added).
116. 29 C.F.R. app. §1630.2(k) (emphasis added).
117. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 67, § I-2.2(b).
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treatment for cocaine addiction several years ago. He has been
successfully rehabilitated and has not engaged in the illegal use of drugs
since receiving treatment. This applicant has a record of an impairment
that substantially limited his major life activities.”118 Nowhere in the
example is there any indication as to how exactly the individual’s
cocaine addiction once substantially limited a major life activity.
Instead, the EEOC seems to proceed from the assumption that cocaine
addiction is, per se, an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity.119
In an even clearer example, the EEOC discusses the situation of an
applicant with a learning disability who had been labeled by her former
employer as mentally retarded.120 The prospective employer reviews this
record and decides not to hire her. According to the EEOC, this
individual would be protected by the “record of” prong because she had
been misclassified by her former employer as being mentally retarded.121
But again, there is no indication from the hypothetical that the former
employer ever described the functional limitations stemming from the
supposed mental retardation. Instead, the EEOC simply assumes that
mental retardation is, per se, a disability and that because the individual
had been labeled as such, she is covered under the “record of” prong.
b.

Special Problems for Plaintiffs Proceeding Under the “Record of”
Prong

Although at odds with the statutory text, such a per se disability
approach is arguably required in order for the “record of” prong to
operate efficiently, both as a practical and a theoretical matter. As a
practical matter, the “records” upon which most ADA plaintiffs rely
include physician’s records, findings of workers’ compensation boards,
and similar documents.122 The individuals and entities preparing these
documents do not usually prepare them in anticipation of ADA
litigation. Accordingly, they may limit their description of an
individual’s condition to a simple diagnosis, possibly expanded upon by
118. Id.
119. See id. (explaining that a casual drug user would not be covered “because casual drug use, as
opposed to addiction, does not substantially limit a major life activity”).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Faulkner v. ATC Vancom of Nev. Ltd. P’ship, No. 98-16467, 1999 WL 1091872,
at *4 (9th Cir. Dec. 2, 1999) (Veterans Administration).
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a description of some of the individual’s symptoms. If one takes
seriously the ADA’s seemingly clear command that an individual must
have a history of an impairment that once substantially limited a major
life activity, these records may often prove insufficient to establish the
existence of a disability based on their vague or brief nature.123 Thus, a
mere diagnosis of heart disease, for example, would not be sufficient to
establish a record of disability unless the diagnosis also described in
detail the functional limitations flowing from the physical impairment.
In addition, requiring something beyond a diagnosis of certain
conditions virtually eliminates the already-tiny misclassification
category of “record of” plaintiffs. Theoretically, there are only two types
of misclassification plaintiffs: (1) those who have the documented
impairment, but are not as limited by the impairment as the
documentation posits and (2) those who have been misdiagnosed (i.e.,
those who do not have the documented impairment at all). Requiring that
the “record” document the functional limitations stemming from an
impairment would not impact individuals in the former category.
However, if there is no such thing as per se disability, one must ask a
hypothetical question in order to resolve the issue of whether an
individual in the latter category has a disability: would the average
individual be substantially limited in a major life activity, if, in fact, the
individual actually had the documented condition?124 Any answer to the
question (aside from being hypothetical in nature) would likely be
irrelevant to the individual’s plight. The danger that a person who has
been misclassified as having an impairment faces is not primarily in the
description of the functional limitations stemming from the
misdiagnosed impairment. Indeed, in the mental retardation example
from the EEOC above, there was no such description.125 The danger
such an individual faces is in the stigma that attaches to mental
retardation. Indeed, in many instances, the primary concern associated
with a misclassification is the stigma associated with the condition in
question.126 Thus, in order for the second prong to function in any
meaningful sense with regard to individuals who have been misclassified

123. See infra notes 147–151 and accompanying text.
124. See EEOC v. Woodbridge Corp., 124 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1139 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (taking this
approach in the case of an individual with a record of carpal tunnel syndrome).
125. See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.
126. See Feldblum, supra note 59, at 536 (noting the “social stigma [posed] simply by
identification” of certain conditions).
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as having a certain impairment, a per se disability approach is actually
required.
Indeed, the tendency on the part of employers to rely on incomplete
information and to focus on the fact of an impairment, rather than
looking at an individual as a whole, seems to be the exact evil Congress
had in mind when it enacted the ADA’s provisions regarding the use of
medical inquiries and examinations.127 As is the case with other types of
records, a medical questionnaire that the employer asks applicants to
complete is unlikely to elicit the type of in-depth responses that would
document the functional limitations an individual once faced.128
Naturally, this lack of detail could be expected to lead many employers
to base their decisions on the name given to an impairment and any
images that that name conjures up rather than on a complete assessment
as to an individual’s present ability to perform the essential functions of
a position. As a theoretical matter then, it might make a good bit of sense
to take a per se disability approach, at least with respect to the “record
of” prong, and define that prong primarily in medical terms.129
c.

The Individualized Inquiry Rule in Practice

Unfortunately for ADA plaintiffs who rely on the second prong,
courts have not taken a per se disability approach. In a number of cases
involving the ADA’s actual and perceived disability prongs, the U.S.
127. See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (II), at 74
(1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 357 (explaining that, in the context of the
prohibition on medical inquiries and examinations “[p]aternalism is perhaps the most pervasive
form of discrimination for people with disabilities and has been a major barrier to such
individuals”); Conroy v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 333 F.3d 88, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2003)
(“[G]eneral diagnoses may expose individuals with disabilities to employer stereotypes . . . .”).
128. See generally Dupre v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys., 242 F. 3d 610, 615 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding that information provided by plaintiff on employer’s “Employee Health Screening Form”
that mentioned plaintiff’s back pain, treatment by a physician, and back surgery lacked the detail
necessary to constitute a record of disability).
129. This is similar to the proposal offered by Professor Mark A. Rothstein and several coauthors. Under this proposal, the ADA would be amended so that the EEOC is empowered to
publish medical standards for determining when the most common mental and physical impairments
are severe enough to be considered disabilities under the ADA. Mark A. Rothstein et al., Using
Established Medical Criteria to Define Disability: A Proposal to Amend the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 244 (2002). The EEOC, in consultation with the medical
profession, would produce medical criteria that distinguish minor impairments from severe
impairments. Id. at 271. Several states employ similar definitions of disability in their disability
discrimination statutes, which define “disability” almost exclusively in medical, rather than
functional, terms by providing non-exhaustive lists of severe impairments. Long, supra note 27, at
638–39. Proposed revision to the ADA’s definition of disability is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Supreme Court has made it clear that a mere diagnosis of an impairment
is insufficient to establish the existence of a disability.130 Instead, a
plaintiff claiming disability status must produce evidence establishing
that the diagnosed impairment substantially limits a major life activity.
And, because the “record of” prong references the definition of an actual
disability, the federal courts have applied the same logic to cases falling
under the “record of” prong.131
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,132 the U.S. Supreme Court
emphasized that the ADA’s definition of disability requires an
“individualized inquiry.”133 In support of this conclusion, the Court
pointed to the fact that the statutory definition of disability “requires that
disabilities be evaluated ‘with respect to an individual’ and be
determined based on whether an impairment substantially limits the
‘major life activities of such individual.’”134 Three years later, the Court
made its point even more clearly, stating unequivocally in Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams135 that “[i]t is insufficient for
individuals attempting to prove disability status under this test to merely
submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment.”136 Instead, an
individual must submit evidence that “the extent of the limitation
[caused by their impairment] in terms of their own experience . . . is
substantial.”137
The full ramifications of this “individualized inquiry” rule are best
illustrated by the Court’s decision in Albertson’s Inc. v. Kirkingburg.138
Although the Court did not decide the case on the grounds of whether
the plaintiff had a disability, the Court scolded the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals for being “too quick to find a disability” in the case of an
individual with amblyopia, an uncorrectable condition that left the
130. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002); Albertson’s, Inc.
v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483
(1999).
131. See, e.g., EEOC v. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 655 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that the
EEOC’s “broad position” regarding the “record of” prong outlined in the Guidance “cannot be the
rule in the wake of Sutton, which emphasizes both the ADA’s requirement of individualized inquiry
and a focus on the actual effects of the impairment”).
132. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
133. Id. at 483.
134. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000)).
135. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
136. Id. at 198.
137. Id. (quoting Albertson’s Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999)).
138. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
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individual with monocular vision.139 The fact that the plaintiff saw
differently than most other people (i.e., only out of one eye) was not
necessarily sufficient to establish that his impairment substantially
limited the major life activity of seeing.140 Instead, according to the U.S.
Supreme Court, the lower court should have relied less on the diagnosis
of plaintiff’s condition and inquired more deeply into the extent of the
plaintiff’s visual restrictions.141 In short, while conceding that
individuals with monocular vision will ordinarily be able to meet the
ADA’s definition of disability, the Court made clear that such
individuals still must prove that the extent of their limitation is
substantial.142 Following Kirkingburg, several courts have conducted the
type of individualized inquiry mandated by the Court with respect to
individuals with monocular vision and come to the conclusion that the
individuals were not, in fact, substantially limited in the major life
activity of seeing.143
Sutton, Toyota Motor, and Kirkingburg all involved individuals
claiming protection under either the actual or perceived disability prongs
of the ADA’s definition of disability. Because the “record of” prong
references a reader back to the actual disability definition, however, the
decisions apply with equal force to the second prong.144 Unless the
impairment once rose to the level of an actual disability, an individual
cannot claim a record of disability.145 Thus, unless individuals claiming
protection under the second prong can produce a diagnosis that is
accompanied by descriptive statements sufficient to establish that the
impairment once substantially limited a major life activity, they may not
be able to claim coverage. This is true regardless of whether the
condition in question is one associated with social stigma.146 As a result,
139. Id. at 564.
140. Id. at 565.
141. Id. at 566.
142. Id. at 567.
143. See, e.g., Flores v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292–93 (S.D. Fla. 2002);
Hoehn v. Int’l Sec. Servs. & Investigations, Inc., No. 97-CV-974A, 2002 WL 31987786, at *10
(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2002); Rivera v. Apple Indus. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2d 202, 214 (E.D.N.Y.
2001); Sherman v. Peters, 110 F. Supp. 2d 194, 199 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
144. See Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., 218 F. Supp. 2d 846, 851 n.4 (W.D. Ky. 2002) (“[T]his
Court cannot perceive any reason why Williams would not apply also to claims brought under the
companion statutory provision of subsection (B).”).
145. See, e.g., Wood v. Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 2003).
146. See Pimental v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic, 236 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.N.H. 2002)
(concluding that plaintiff who had recovered from breast cancer after eight months of radiation
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numerous individuals have fallen prey to the special traps associated
with the “record of” prong, either because their physicians147 or other
entities148 failed to document the extent of their limitations, because the
limitations that were documented failed to rise to the level of substantial
limitations,149 or because they were unable to produce any
documentation at all.150 In numerous instances, individuals have been
denied coverage under the “record of” prong based on documentation
problems, despite the fact that the legislative history indicates and the
EEOC suggests that they were exactly the type of individuals Congress
sought to protect.151

treatment and chemotherapy and who had endured a modified radical mastectomy did not have a
record of disability).
147. See Coons v. Sec’y, 383 F.3d 879, 886 (9th Cir. 2004); Burton v. Potter, 339 F. Supp. 2d
706, 712–13 (M.D.N.C. 2004); see also Williams v. Kerr-McGee Corp., No. 96-6090, 1997 WL
158176, at *8 (10th Cir. Apr. 1, 1997) (affirming summary judgment in favor of employer where
doctor’s letter did not affirmatively state plaintiff had lupus or that plaintiff was substantially
limited in any major life activity).
148. See Faulkner v. ATC Vancom of Nev. Ltd. P’ship, No. 98-16467, 1999 WL 1091872, at *4
(9th Cir. Dec. 2, 1999) (affirming summary judgment in favor of employer where plaintiff’s letter
from the Veterans Administration stating that plaintiff was 40% disabled did not establish a record
of disability because it did not describe the basis of plaintiff’s limitations or the nature, permanence,
or severity of his condition); Flasza v. TNT Holland Motor Exp., Inc., 156 F.R.D. 672, 677 (N.D.
Ill. 1994) (granting employer’s motion for summary judgment where workers’ compensation
records detailed varying degrees of loss of use of body parts, but failed to detail any substantial
limitation of any major life activity).
149. See, e.g., Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 915 (8th Cir. 1999).
150. See Little I, 147 S.W.3d 421, 425 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003), rev’d, 148 S.W.3d 374 (Tex. 2004).
Even in those rare cases where an individual is misclassified as having an impairment, a mere
diagnosis, without any record that the impairment substantially limited a major life activity, may be
insufficient to establish coverage under the “record of” prong. See generally EEOC v. Woodbridge
Corp., 124 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1139 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (stating that even if plaintiff had been
misclassified as having carpal tunnel syndrome as she claimed, she did not have a record of a
disability because carpal tunnel syndrome is not usually considered a disability).
151. See supra notes 41 & 103 (discussing legislative history listing individuals with a history of
mental or neurological illness, heart attack, cancer, mental illness, or mental retardation as being
within the coverage of the “record of” prong); supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative history listing individuals who are paraplegic, deaf, have a lung disease, and who are
infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) as being within the coverage of the actual
disability prong); supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing EEOC’s position that
recovering cocaine addict would be covered under the “record of” prong); Sebest v. Campbell City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 94 F. App’x 320 (6th Cir. 2004) (severe obstructive pulmonary lung
disease); Blanks v. Sw. Bell Commc’ns, Inc., 310 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002) (HIV-positive status);
Taylor v. Nimock’s Oil Co., 214 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2000) (heart attack); Ellison v. Software
Spectrum, 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996) (cancer); Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d
350 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (bipolar disorder); Jackson Mem. Hosp. Pub. Health Trust, 33 F. Supp. 2d
1336 (S.D. Fla. 1998), aff’d, 198 F.3d 263 (11th Cir. 1999) (alcoholism).
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2.

A Record of Hospitalization Doth Not a Record of Disability Make:
The Individualized Inquiry Rule Continued

The extent to which the federal courts have insisted that courts focus
on the “substantial limitation” language of the ADA’s definition of
disability has also undermined the ability of “record of” plaintiffs to rely
on a previous U.S. Supreme Court precedent that established an
expansive conception of the second prong. In the early years after the
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, plaintiffs generally had little
difficulty establishing the existence of a disability.152 Plaintiffs
proceeding under the “record of” prong were no exception.153 By the
mid 1980s, however, a number of decisions began to pop up in which
defendants successfully challenged the existence of a plaintiff’s
disability.154 These decisions perhaps should have been a warning sign
for disability rights advocates as they set to work drafting the ADA.
However, any concerns that advocates may have had appear to have
been allayed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s seemingly expansive
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of disability in
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.
Arline involved a teacher who had been fired after a relapse of
tuberculosis.155 Over 20 years earlier, Arline had been hospitalized for
tuberculosis.156 The school board did not dispute the fact that it had
discharged Arline due to its concern over her contagiousness, but argued
instead that (a) Arline did not have a disability because Congress could
not have intended to include contagious diseases within Section 504’s
definition of disability and (b) Arline was not qualified for the teaching
position due to her contagiousness.157 The U.S. Supreme Court
concluded that a jury question existed as to whether Arline was qualified
for the position, but before reaching that conclusion, it concluded that
Arline fit neatly within Section 504’s “record of” prong.158
152. Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 745–46 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (noting that, by
1984, only one court had found a plaintiff not to be handicapped).
153. See Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding that plaintiff had a record
of disability and was regarded as having such, based in part on the legislative history of the Act,
“which indicates that the definition is not to be construed in a niggardly fashion”).
154. See, e.g., Pridemore v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 625 F. Supp. 1171, 1175 (S.D. Ohio 1985)
(concluding that attorney’s cerebral palsy did not substantially limit any of his major life activities).
155. 480 U.S. 273, 276 (1987).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 277.
158. Id. at 281, 289.
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In reaching its decision, the Court relied on the regulations
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services, which
defined the various terms within Section 504’s definition of disability
and which later served as the basis for the definition of the ADA’s
terms.159 Although ostensibly ruling on the plaintiff’s coverage under the
“record of” prong, the Court spoke extensively about the Act’s purposes
as they related to the “regarded as” prong.160 The Court discussed in
detail the “irrational fear” that individuals who have recovered from
infectious and even non-infectious diseases face, and explained that the
Act was designed “to replace such reflexive reactions to actual or
perceived handicaps with actions based on reasoned and medically
sound judgments.”161 It would therefore defeat the purposes of the Act if
those with contagious diseases could be denied coverage based on the
ignorance of others where reasonable accommodations could limit the
threat of contagiousness to others.162
Regarding proof that Arline had a record of disability, the fact that her
“impairment was serious enough to require hospitalization [was] more
than sufficient to establish that one or more of her major life activities
were substantially limited by her impairment.”163 If one takes Arline at
its word, the decision seems to say that an individual’s record of
hospitalization should be sufficient to establish coverage under the
“record of” prong. However, as disability rights advocates quickly
learned, appearances can be deceiving.
In Taylor v. United States Postal Service,164 a case decided four years
after Arline and shortly before the ADA became effective, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals found Arline to be unhelpful as to the proper
analysis of a claim brought under the “record of” prong.165 The Sixth
Circuit noted that the Arline Court had failed to provide any details
concerning the length of Arline’s hospitalization or the severity of her
affliction.166 “Therefore,” the court concluded, “unless we read Arline as
establishing the nonsensical proposition that any hospital stay is

159. Id. at 280.
160. Id. at 284.
161. Id. at 285.
162. Id. at 284.
163. Id. at 281.
164. 946 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir. 1991).
165. Id. at 1217.
166. Id.
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sufficient to evidence a ‘record of impairment,’ which we decline to do,
the case offers us little guidance.”167
The Taylor decision struck two major blows against Arline. First, by
pointing out the shortcomings of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion with
respect to the application of the second prong, Taylor effectively clued
other federal courts in to the fact that Arline’s statements with respect to
the “record of” prong might not hold up under a rigorous examination of
the statutory language. In making this observation, Taylor also directed
future courts and litigants to Arline’s much more detailed statements
about the “regarded as” prong.168 Thus, Taylor represented one more
clue, in addition to Arline and the ADA’s legislative history, that the
“regarded as” prong was, between the two, the potentially more
promising section in the ADA’s three-part definition.
The second blow struck by Taylor was its dismissal of the idea that
any record of hospitalization established a record of disability. Later
courts would seize on Taylor’s reasoning about the “nonsensical”
implications of Arline’s broad statements about hospitalization and reach
the same conclusion.169 Thus, those individuals who cannot establish
coverage under the second prong by virtue of a mere diagnosis of an
impairment are also now generally precluded from establishing coverage
based on the mere fact that they were once hospitalized because of their
impairment.
3.

The Single-Job Rule Problem

Another interpretation of the ADA’s definition of disability that has
limited the scope of all three prongs is the U.S. Supreme Court’s
clarification as to what constitutes a substantial limitation in the specific
major life activity of working. If an individual claims to be substantially
limited in the major life activity of working, the individual must
establish that she is “significantly restricted in the ability to perform
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as
compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Gutridge v. Clure, 153 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Burch v. Coca-Cola Co.,
119 F.3d 305, 317 (5th Cir. 1997); Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 645–46
(2d Cir. 1995); Byrne v. Bd. of Educ., Sch. of W. Allis-W. Milwaukee, 979 F.2d 560, 566 (7th Cir.
1992); see generally Sorensen v. Univ. of Utah Hosp., 194 F.3d 1084, 1087–88 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding that plaintiff with multiple sclerosis failed to establish a record of disability based upon
five-day hospitalization).
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abilities.”170 An impairment that prevents an individual from performing
“a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the
major life activity of working.”171 Accordingly, an employee who has a
record of an impairment that only precluded the individual from working
at a single job or who is perceived as having such an impairment does
not have a disability under the ADA.172
In the case of individuals proceeding under the “regarded as” prong,
numerous commentators have made the charge that the single-job rule
opens the door to exactly the type of irrational or uninformed decisions
on the part of employers that the third prong was designed to guard
against.173 The single-job rule, in effect, gives license to whatever
idiosyncratic fear or belief an employer might hold, provided that the
employer’s belief about the individual’s impairment is not so sweeping
that, if true, it would affect the individual’s ability to perform the duties
of a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.174 Most of the criticism of the
single-job rule has been directed at judicial treatment of individuals who
claim to have been regarded as having an impairment that substantially
limits the major life activity of working. However, because individuals
with histories of certain impairments or who have been misclassified
with certain impairments are vulnerable to exactly the same forms of
discrimination,175 the same criticisms apply with equal force to judicial
decisions involving plaintiffs under the “record of” prong.
4.

The Permanent or Long-Term Impact Rule Problem

The scope of the “record of” prong has also been limited by the
approach of courts that requires either that the duration of the
impairment be long-term or that the impact of the impairment be
permanent or long-term. After the enactment of the ADA, the EEOC
regulations provided that the following factors should be considered in
determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity:

170. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (emphasis added) (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2006)).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Tice v. Cent. Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 2001).
173. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 977 (2003).
174. Id.
175. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
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(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected
permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the
impairment.176
Based on these factors, courts frequently found that impairments that
lasted a relatively short period of time or that had little to no long-term
impact on an individual did not substantially limit an individual’s major
life activities.177 For example, an individual who was unable to work for
a period of only a few days as a result of an impairment would be
unlikely to prevail on a claim that he was substantially limited in the
major life activity of working.178
Theoretically, the duration of the impairment and the permanent or
long-term impact of the impairment did not necessarily control in each
case. In some cases, the nature and severity of the impairment might be
sufficient to overcome the relative weakness of one of the other two
factors.179 In practice, however, courts often adopted something
approximating a presumption, if not an outright interpretive rule, against
finding a disability where either the duration of the impairment or the
impact of the impairment was temporary or short-term.180 This
preoccupation with time occasionally led to bizarre results. In one
instance, a federal district court concluded that an individual who had
been fired from his job a year after being diagnosed as HIV-positive
could not proceed under the “record of” prong because, although the
impairment would exist for the rest of life, his one-year history with the
impairment was not of sufficient length to constitute a history of
impairment since his impairment was (in the words of the court)
“virtually brand new.”181
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Toyota Motor
Manufacturing perhaps went further than the approach of some prior
federal decisions by condensing the EEOC’s three-factor test into a
176. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (2006).
177. See, e.g., Hilburn v. Murata Elec. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir. 1999).
178. Cf. Thompson v. Eaton Corp., No. 02-C-051-C, 2002 WL 31995670, at *9 (W.D. Wisc.
Dec. 11, 2002) (holding that the inability to work for five weeks was an insufficient period of time
to establish a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working).
179. See Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 100 n.6 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[T]he three listed factors
can combine in a number of different ways, even to the exclusion of one or more of them.”).
180. See, e.g., Pollard v. High’s of Balt, Inc., 281 F.3d 462, 468 (4th Cir. 2002).
181. Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1322 (E.D. Pa. 1994).

707

LONG

11/5/2006 1:09:07 PM

Washington Law Review

Vol. 81:669, 2006

simple requirement that “[t]he impairment’s impact must . . . be
permanent or long term.”182 While the EEOC’s approach allowed the
fact finder to consider the severity and duration of the impairment along
with the impact or residual effects of the impairment, the Court’s
reformulation of the test focused on the residual effects of the
impairment to the exclusion of the other factors. This means that
individuals with cases that might previously have survived a motion to
dismiss or summary judgment based on the severity of the impairment
may now lose because they cannot show a permanent or long-term
impact.183 Consequently, the Court’s more restrictive holding from
Toyota Motor Manufacturing significantly limits the number of
individuals who can claim protection under any of the three prongs of
the definition.
D.

The Mitigating Measures and Permanent or Long-Term Impact
Conundrum (The New Catch-22?)

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton that an individual’s use
of mitigating or corrective devices must be taken into account when
deciding whether the individual’s impairment substantially limits a
major life activity has also limited the scope of the ADA’s actual
disability prong. Initially, it appeared that the “record of” prong might
provide an alternative avenue of coverage. However, in practice not only
has the “record of” prong failed to provide plaintiffs with a way around
the Court’s mitigating measures rule, “record of” plaintiffs who employ
such measures may face a new Catch-22 by virtue of the Court’s
restrictive reading of the ADA’s definition of disability.
1.

The Mitigating Measures Rule and the Window of Opportunity

In keeping with its view that there must be an individualized inquiry
into the existence of a disability under the ADA, the U.S. Supreme Court
held in Sutton that an individual’s use of mitigating or corrective devices
must be taken into account when deciding whether the individual’s
impairment substantially limits a major life activity.184 For example, an
182. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002).
183. Cf. McKenzie v. Dovala, 242 F.3d 967, 973 (10th Cir. 2001) (deciding, under the EEOC’s
approach, that a jury question existed as to whether the individual had a record of disability, but
stating that “the permanent or long-term impact of [the individual’s] illness would not tend to
support a finding of disability”).
184. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
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individual with epilepsy who takes medication that limits the number
and intensity of seizures might not be substantially limited in any major
life activity.185 Sutton’s mitigating measures rule, therefore, had the
potential to limit dramatically the coverage of the ADA for the many
individuals who employed some type of remedial or corrective measure
to help them go about their daily lives.
There appeared, at first glance, to be one gaping hole in the decision,
however. If an individual could not claim actual disability status
because, through the use of mitigating measures, the individual was no
longer presently substantially limited in a major life activity, the most
logical alternative would be to proceed under a “record of” theory.186 In
other words, if an individual was not now substantially limited in a
major life activity due to the use of mitigating measures, perhaps the
individual had a history of disability and would be able claim the
protection of the “record of” prong.187 After all, the second prong was
designed to cover those individuals who had recovered in whole or in
part from a disabling condition.188 And the EEOC had taken the position
that the prong covered those “whose illnesses are either cured,
controlled or in remission.”189 Thus, there remained at least the hope that
the impact of Sutton would be relatively minor. However, now that more
than six years have passed without a wave of plaintiffs taking advantage
of this supposed loophole of Sutton, one must wonder whether the
loophole is more imagined than real.

185. See Brunke v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 344 F.3d 819, 821–22 (8th Cir. 2003).
186. See Gilbert, supra note 18, at 673 (suggesting that since Sutton limited the population of
individuals with actual disabilities, “‘record of’ claims may receive more attention from the
courts”); Tucker, supra note 18, at 351–55 (arguing that an individual whose impairment had been
completely “cured” should be able to claim protection under the “record of prong,” despite Sutton,
as should an individual whose impairment can be treated to the point that there is no longer a
substantial limitation of a major life activity). Bagenstos, supra note 18, at 503 (arguing that the
“record of” prong could be used by plaintiffs who might not have an actual disability by virtue of
their use of mitigating measures); Shannon P. Duffy, U.S. Supreme Court’s ADA Rulings Shake
Plaintiffs’ Employment Bar, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 24, 1999, at 1 (quoting plaintiff’s
attorney as saying that, after Sutton, many cases can be saved “by going immediately to the second
prong”).
187. See Duffy, supra note 186, at 10 (“Most people who have mitigating measures will have a
history that you can point to.”).
188. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
189. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 67 (emphasis added), § I-2.2(b).
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The “Cured” Versus “Controlled” Impairment Conundrum

There are several reasons why plaintiffs’ attorneys might believe that
the “record of” prong does not provide a meaningful alternative basis of
coverage for those who utilize a mitigating or corrective device to
control the effects of an impairment that once substantially limited a
major life activity. First, in one section of the Sutton opinion, Justice
O’Connor, writing for the majority, discusses various ways in which a
plaintiff who employs mitigating measures that alleviate some of the
effects of an impairment might nonetheless prove disability status. In
one passage, Justice O’Connor suggests that “one whose high blood
pressure is ‘cured’ by medication may be regarded as disabled by a
covered entity, and thus disabled under subsection (C) [the perceived
disability prong] of the definition.”190 The passage is curious, in part,
because one who is taking medication to regulate a condition has not
“cured” the underlying condition so much as the person has controlled
the condition. Thus, it would be more accurate to say that high blood
pressure is a “treatable” or “controllable” condition. The passage is also
curious in that Justice O’Connor references the “regarded as” prong,
rather than the “record of” prong, as the relevant section of the ADA’s
definition of disability. While the passage does not necessarily exclude
the possibility that such an individual might be disabled under the
“record of” prong, that prong would, nonetheless, seem to be the more
natural alternative to an actual disability claim in the given
circumstances. Therefore, one is left to wonder why Justice O’Connor
would rush straight to the “regarded as” prong for coverage rather than
stopping at the more logical spot.
The suspicion that the majority’s exclusion of the applicability of the
“record of” prong in its hypothetical was intentional is heightened by the
fact that this is exactly how Justice Stevens read the majority opinion.
The “record of” prong, Justice Stevens observed in his dissent, “plainly
covers a person who previously had a serious . . . impairment that has
since been completely cured.”191 In contrast, the Sutton plaintiffs’
impairments had not been “completely cured.” Instead, they were
“treatable” in the sense their effects could be controlled through the use
of mitigating devices. Yet, Justice O’Connor failed to mention the
“record of” prong when discussing where individuals with such treatable

190. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488 (1999).
191. Id. at 498–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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conditions might find coverage under the ADA’s definition of disability.
This, perhaps, explains Justice Stevens’s conclusion with respect to the
extent of the Court’s holding. “[I]f I correctly understand the Court’s
opinion,” Stevens stated, “one who continues to wear a hearing aid that
she has worn all her life might not be covered [under the definition]—
fully cured impairments are covered, but merely treatable ones are
not.”192
The final reason to suspect that ADA plaintiffs who have been
disqualified under the actual disability prong by Sutton cannot use the
“record of” prong as part of an end run around the holding is that, to
date, plaintiffs and courts have largely failed to pursue this avenue. If
ADA plaintiffs who employ mitigating measures to control the effects of
an impairment could simply resort to the “record of” prong, the scope of
Sutton’s holding would be dramatically limited.193 Thus, one should
naturally expect numerous plaintiffs to have asserted coverage under the
“record of” prong when they have successfully employed mitigating
measures to offset the effects of their impairments. One might also
expect that at least some courts would have either raised the issue sua
sponte or suggested such a course of action for future litigants. To date,
however, this simply has not happened. Between the years 2000 and
2005, there were numerous reported federal appellate decisions in which
an employment discrimination plaintiff’s disability status under the
ADA or Rehabilitation Act was at issue and the individual’s use of
mitigating measures was somehow relevant to the question of disability
status.194 As Figure 3 illustrates, however, if the “record of” prong
provides a window of opportunity for individuals who employ corrective
or mitigating measures, ADA plaintiffs have failed to take advantage of
it.

192. Id. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. See Tucker, supra note 18, at 352, 372.
194. I conducted a Westlaw search of the database containing reported federal appellate court
decisions, “U.S. Courts of Appeals Cases, Reported (CTAR),” for the years 2000 through 2005.
Sutton was decided in June of 1999. Therefore, establishing the year 2000 as the starting point
enabled both the lower and appellate courts to react to Sutton and to allow some pending cases to be
considered in light of Sutton. I used the following search terms: “Sutton” & “Americans with
Disabilities Act” “Rehabilitation Act” & “substantial! limit!” & “MITIGAT!” “CORRECT!” The
limitations of this search are generally the same as those described in note 19 supra.
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Number of Instances in Reported Federal Appellate
Decisions in Which a Plaintiff’s Disability Status
Was in Dispute and in Which the Mitigating
Measures Rule Was Relevant195

Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total

Actual
8
4
4
4
4
2
26

Theory of Disability
Record
3
1
1
1
1
1
8

Perceived
5
2
4
1
3
2
17

As Figure 3 illustrates, “record of” claims involving the use of
mitigating measures still lag far behind claims under the actual and
“regarded as” prongs. Also, as Figure 4 illustrates, plaintiffs asserting
claims under the second prong have not had any greater measure of
success in cases involving the use of mitigating measures than they have
in other situations under the ADA. Only once during this period did an
individual avoid losing on appeal on the question of disability status
while arguing the “record of” prong in a mitigating measures case.196

195. See supra note 193.
196. Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2001).
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Figure 4:

Year

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total

Plaintiff Success Rates Depending Upon the Theory
of Disability in Cases Involving the Mitigating
Measures Rule197
Favorable Outcomes/Theory of Disability Per
Theory of Disability
Actual
Record
Perceived
2/8
0/3
0/5
2/4
1/1
0/2
1/4
0/1
0/4
1/4
0/1
1/1
2/4
0/1
0/3
1/2
0/1
0/2
9/26
1/8
1/17
(34.6%)
(12.5%)
(5.9%)

Anecdotally, it does not appear that plaintiffs fare any better under the
“record of” prong at the trial court level or in unreported cases when the
mitigating measures rule is at issue.198 In numerous cases, individuals
who employ corrective or mitigating devices have been denied coverage
at the trial level under both the actual and “record of” prongs. Thus, to
the extent there were predictions that the “record of” prong would be the
silver bullet to the U.S. Supreme Court’s mitigating measures rule, those
predictions have not proved accurate.
There are three possible explanations for the general failure of
plaintiffs to take advantage of the window of opportunity arguably left
open by Sutton. First it may simply be, as Justice Stevens suggested, that
Sutton leaves open no window at all for those who have not been totally
“cured” of their underlying impairments but who instead continue to
employ mitigating measures they have used their whole lives.199 The
197. See supra note 193.
198. For a few examples, see Manz v. Gaffney, 56 F. App’x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that
plaintiff whose vision could be corrected to 20/20 in both eyes had neither an actual disability nor a
record of disability); Dunlap v. Boeing Helicopter Div., No. 03-CV-2111, 2005 WL 435228, at *6
(E.D. Pa., Feb. 23, 2005) (holding that plaintiff who wore hearing aids in both ears did not establish
coverage under any of the ADA’s disability prongs); Mercer v. Brunt, 299 F. Supp. 2d 21, 28 (D.
Conn. 2004) (identifying all three prongs in ADA’s definition of disability but holding that
plaintiff’s hypertension, anxiety, and depression did not constitute disabilities since they were
controlled by medication).
199. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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appellate courts’ general silence in the face of facts that clearly raise the
possibility of coverage under the “record of” prong,200 and occasionally
their express statements on the subject,201 may arguably be read in
support of Stevens’s view.
Second, it may simply be a case of bad lawyering. Plaintiffs’
attorneys are not taking full advantage of the window of opportunity
provided by Sutton. Perhaps, as is arguably the case more generally with
the ADA, plaintiffs’ attorneys are not making use of a potentially
effective tool in the plaintiff’s arsenal.
Finally, it may simply be that whatever window Sutton leaves open is
rendered exceedingly small for individuals with treatable conditions by
virtue of the Court’s other holdings regarding the definition of an actual
disability.202 For example, in Sutton, the Court held that two individuals
with up to 20/400 uncorrected vision that was corrected to 20/20 through
the use of corrective lenses did not have actual disabilities.203
Presumably, these legally blind individuals were substantially limited in
the major life activity of seeing for at least a period of time in their lives.
However, if their conditions were detected and addressed early, they
may have only been substantially limited for a short period of time. In
that case, the duration of the impairment would be relatively short, thus
possibly depriving such individuals under the approach of some courts,
which focus heavily on time considerations.204 Since Sutton, several
200. See, e.g., Davis v. Pennsylvania, No. CIV.A. 01-3091, 2002 WL 334391, at *3–4 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 22, 2002) (noting plaintiff’s failure to raise claims under the second and third prongs and
dismissing plaintiff’s actual disability claim because plaintiff’s visual impairment could be
corrected to a 20/20 visual acuity level with corrective lenses).
201. See Winters v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 124 F. App’x 822 (5th Cir. 2005). In Winters, the
plaintiff had been hospitalized for depression. The Fifth Circuit of Appeals noted that the plaintiff’s
condition was treatable with medication. Id. at 824. “In this context,” the court held, the plaintiff’s
evidence was insufficient to create a question for the jury on her “record of” claim. Id. See generally
Sanders v. FMAS Corp., 180 F. Supp. 2d 698, 705 (D. Md. 2001) (“While Plaintiff may have a
history of asthma, she does not allege that it substantially limits her in a major life activity and
admits that it is controllable with medication.”).
202. See, e.g., Manz, 56 F. App’x at 52 (holding that plaintiff whose vision could be corrected to
20/20 in both eyes had neither an actual disability nor a record of disability).
203. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475, 488 (1999).
204. See supra notes 176–182 and accompanying text; Bagenstos, supra note 18, at 502
(suggesting that because there was no evidence that the Sutton plaintiffs had spent a substantial
amount of time with their impairments before employing mitigating measures, the plaintiffs likely
would not have had a record of disability). But see MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d
326, 339–40 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding in the context of a case brought under Title II of the ADA
that, notwithstanding the mitigating effects of methadone on individuals’ drug addictions,
individuals had a record of disability since they had a history of at least one year of opiate or
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ADA plaintiffs have fallen victim to this approach.205 Some individuals
seek treatment for conditions that, at the time of treatment, do not
amount to actual disabilities, but which could evolve into disabilities if
left untreated.206 Where such an individual undergoes treatment, it might
be thought that the plaintiff could claim disability status as a result of
being substantially limited during the period of treatment and recovery.
However, unless the plaintiff was substantially limited for an extended
period of time during the treatment and recovery, the relatively short
duration of the impairment might prevent the plaintiff from claiming
protection under the “record of” prong.207 And because the second prong
is, as a matter of statutory interpretation, tied to the actual disability
prong, other “record of” plaintiffs with treatable impairments may fall
victim to any of the other general restrictive interpretations of the
ADA’s definition of an actual disability, such as the single-job rule.208
3.

Are Cured Impairments Covered?: The New Catch-22

Numerous commentators have noted the various Catch-22s the ADA
presents for plaintiffs. For example, an individual who is able to avoid
the effects of the single-job rule by proving that an impairment is
substantial enough to preclude the individual from a class or broad range
of jobs may have also presented the same evidence the employer will
narcotic addiction, including physical dependence).
205. See, e.g., Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1132 (10th Cir. 2003)
(concluding that individual with bipolar disorder did not have a record of disability because her
periods of incapacitation were limited); Jewell v. Reid’s Confectionary Co., 172 F. Supp. 2d 212,
214–15, 217 (D. Me. 2001) (concluding that plaintiff did not have a record of disability where he
recovered from a heart attack within the span of several months after having an internal defibrillator
implanted in his chest); Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 350, 356–58 (N.D.N.Y.
2000) (concluding that plaintiff who had been briefly hospitalized for treatment of bipolar disorder
and whose disorder was effectively controlled by medication and treatment did not have a record of
disability); see also Collado v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 419 F.3d 1143 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding
that individual with diabetes, who had been insulin-dependent since the age of 14, did not have a
record of disability).
206. See Tucker, supra note 18, at 352 (noting that some individuals employ mitigating measures
to alleviate the effects of a condition that does not constitute an actual disability).
207. Gutridge v. Clure, 153 F.3d 898, 901–02 (8th Cir. 1998).
208. See Kiser v. Original, Inc., 32 S.W.3d 449, 452–53 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding, under
similar state statute, that an individual with controlled epilepsy did not have an actual disability
because he did not have an impairment that precluded him from a class of jobs or a broad range of
jobs, nor did he have a record of such an impairment). See generally Simms v. City of New York,
160 F. Supp. 2d 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that plaintiff with diabetes that was controllable with
insulin did not have an actual disability or a record of disability because “maintaining stable blood
[sugar] levels” is not a major life activity).
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rely on to show that the individual was “too disabled” to be qualified for
the position in question.209 However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
statement in Toyota Motor Manufacturing that the impact of an
individual’s impairment must be permanent or long term, if read
literally, may perhaps be the most ingenious Catch-22 ever devised for
plaintiffs claiming protection under the “record of” prong.
The “record of” prong was designed to cover those individuals who
have recovered, in whole or in part, from a once-disabling impairment.210
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Sutton assumes that individuals who have
been “cured” will be able to obtain coverage under the “record of”
prong, despite Sutton’s mitigating measures rule.211 However, if the
word “impact” is read to refer to the residual effects of an impairment,212
then the application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s rule from Toyota
Motor Manufacturing to the “record of” prong context would mean that
few plaintiffs who have been “cured” of their impairment will ever
obtain coverage under the “record of” prong. In most cases, there will be
no permanent, limiting impact on an individual who has been “cured”—
by definition, a “cure” permanently alleviates a condition.213 Presumably
then, an individual who has been “cured” would suffer little or no
permanent or long-term impact and no future long-term impact.
If this reading of Sutton and Toyota Motor Manufacturing is correct,
there are only limited instances in which a “cured” individual could
obtain (and would actually need) coverage under the “record of” prong.
One such instance would be where the cure itself caused some
permanent or long-term adverse impact, such as lingering side effects.
However, if the side effects were substantial enough, the individual
might have an actual disability and have no need for the “record of”
prong.214

209. See, e.g., Barbara Hoffman, Between a Disability and a Hard Place: The Cancer Survivor’s
Catch-22 of Proving Disability Status Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 59 MD. L. REV.
352, 353 (2000).
210. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
212. This is how the EEOC defines the term. 29 C.F.R. app. §1630.2(j) (2006) (“[T]he term
‘impact’ refers to the residual effects of an impairment.”).
213. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 316 (1986).
214. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475, 482 (1999) (stating that the effects
of mitigating measures “—both positive and negative—must be taken into account when judging
whether that person is ‘substantially limited’ in a major life activity”).
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Even if a court chose not to apply the U.S. Supreme Court’s
permanent or long-term impact rule to the “record of” prong, the focus
on the duration of an impairment may work to prevent many individuals
who have been “cured” form obtaining coverage under the “record of”
prong. As discussed, an individual who is “cured” relatively quickly may
fall victim to the requirement that the duration of the impairment be
long-term before the impairment may qualify as a disability.215 In other
cases, an individual may need to wait a considerable length of time after
the onset or diagnosis of the impairment before seeking treatment and
ultimately being “cured” in order to escape this long-term duration rule.
In many cases (cancer, hypertension, etc.), such delay between
diagnosis and treatment could be fatal, and in most other instances such
a course of action is hardly prudent. Yet, it is the bind in which the
permanent or long-term impact rule appears to place individuals. In most
instances, by “curing” oneself of an impairment that was temporarily
substantially limiting, one may very well be unprotected by the “record
of” prong. Such a result seems almost too bizarre to contemplate given
the fact that the second prong was designed to cover “cured”
individuals.216 But if Toyota Motors Manufacturing is read literally,217 it
will be the likely result in many cases. Even where it is not, the courts’
focus on the duration of the impairment may limit coverage under the
“record of” prong in such cases.
In sum, to date the “record of” prong has not proven to be an effective
alternative for individuals who have been denied coverage under the
actual disability prong by virtue of the mitigating measures rule.
Plaintiffs seeking to avoid the confines of the Court’s mitigating
measures rule by resorting to the “record of” prong may find themselves
ensnared by some of the Court’s restrictive interpretations of the
definition of disability. Thus, despite the fact that the “record of” prong
was designed to cover those who have recovered in whole or in part

215. See supra notes 204–205 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
217. See Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., 218 F. Supp. 2d 846, 851 n.4 (W.D. Ky. 2002) (“[T]his
Court cannot perceive any reason why [Toyota Motor Manufacturing] would not apply also to
claims brought under the companion statutory provision of subsection (B).”). Some federal courts
have ignored, without explanation, the Court’s “permanent or long term” rule in the case of
plaintiffs proceeding under the “record of prong” and relied instead upon the EEOC’s original
multi-factor approach. See, e.g., McMullin v. Ashcroft, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1297 (D. Wyo.
2004); Lloyd v. E. Cleveland City Sch. Dist., 232 F. Supp. 2d 806, 812 (N.D. Ohio 2002);
Vandeveer v. Fort James Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 918, 936–37 (E.D. Wis. 2002).
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from a once limiting condition, in practice, many such individuals have
been or can expect to be denied coverage.
E.

Other Limitations on the “Record of” Prong

Each of the general interpretive rules discussed above may
individually limit the overall reach of the ADA’s definition of disability.
However, these rules may also combine in any number of ways. When
they work together or in conjunction with the special rule that a plaintiff
must establish that an employer relied on a tangible document in order to
fit within the “record of” prong, the rules may create a perfect storm
with the potential to sink an even greater number of claims brought
under the second prong.
For example, the requirement of some courts that a plaintiff must
establish that an employer relied on a tangible record in order to fit
within the “record of” prong may impose a significant obstacle for
“record of” plaintiffs with treatable conditions. This obstacle may exist
even where a plaintiff might otherwise escape the confines of the
mitigating measures and permanent or long-term impact rules.218 Even
where plaintiffs can produce a record that contains a diagnosis or general
description of their condition, other interpretive rules may rise up to
defeat their claims. For example, plaintiffs like Evelyn Little, described
in the Introduction, would seem to escape the permanent or long-term
impact rule even though it was a year before she was fitted with a
prosthetic and several more years before she could walk without a
cane.219 However, despite the fact that her prospective employer relied
on a “record” (her application form) that noted her impairment, this
record was (for some reason not explained by the court) insufficient to
amount to the type of “record” required for coverage under the second
prong.220 Perhaps the record was insufficient because it did not describe
the functional limitations she formerly faced.221 Regardless, she could
218. See Campbell v. Prince George’s County Md., No. Civ.A. AW-99-870, 2001 WL 21257, at
*4 (D. Md. Jan. 4, 2001) (concluding that plaintiff who had undergone a liver transplant and
required medication for her liver to function effectively did not have a record of disability because
she did not list her liver transplant on her employment application form).
219. Little I, 147 S.W.3d 421, 425 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003), rev’d, 148 S.W.3d 374 (Tex. 2004).
220. Id.
221. This is pure speculation on my part. However, it is difficult to come up with any other
explanation for the court’s unwillingness to recognize Little as having a record of disability, other
than the possibility that the court viewed the condition as being treatable, rather than cured, and thus
not eligible for coverage under Sutton. See supra notes 190–192 and accompanying text.
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not claim coverage under the portion of the definition of disability that
seems to have been tailor-made for her situation.
The ultimate consequence of the general interpretive rules combining
with the more specific rules to deny coverage to ADA plaintiffs under
the “record of” prong is that it is extremely difficult for the “record of”
prong to serve any function in rooting out intentional discrimination. For
example, in Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, Inc.,222 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York denied an
individual coverage under the “record of” prong, despite the fact that the
case seemed to present a textbook example of discrimination based upon
a history of disability. In Horwitz, the employer withdrew a job offer
after requiring the applicant to complete a medical questionnaire.223 The
employer’s proffered reason for its about-face was the fact that the
applicant had responded untruthfully and incompletely on the
questionnaire.224 Specifically, the applicant had not answered the
question regarding whether she had ever collected workers’
compensation.225
The applicant testified she did not complete this section because she
feared the fact she had collected workers’ compensation for her bipolar
disorder might be held against her.226 Interestingly, the applicant had
disclosed on the questionnaire the fact that she had bipolar disorder, took
medication, and had been hospitalized for the condition.227 After the
employer pointed out the omission, the applicant disclosed her receipt of
workers’ compensation.228 The employer also claimed that the applicant
had been untruthful in claiming not to have been treated by a physician
within the past 12 months when she was, in fact, being seen by a
psychiatrist at the time.229 In response, the applicant claimed to have
been truthful insofar as she believed a psychiatrist to be different from a
physician.230 After uncovering these supposed inconsistencies and
omissions, the employer withdrew its job offer.231
222. 122 F. Supp. 2d 350 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
223. Id. at 352.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 351.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 351 n.2.
231. Id. at 351.
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The employer’s motivation for the withdrawal would seem to present
a classic jury question. While the applicant’s answers to the
questionnaire may arguably have been false, the fact that the withdrawal
of the job offer occurred after the employer learned of the applicant’s
bipolar disorder—a condition commonly associated with social stigma—
might suggest the employer was motivated, at least in part, by a rational
or irrational response to the applicant’s history of bipolar disorder.232
Given her past receipt of workers’ compensation benefits, the plaintiff
might also have encountered the kind of attitudinal barriers that cause
some employers not to hire individuals with prior histories of
impairment.233 Given the employee’s recent history of psychiatric
treatment, the facts could also easily support the conclusion that the
employer was fearful that the plaintiff would have a propensity for
relapse.234 Therefore, based on the individual’s history of impairment,
the fact that the case involved tangible documentation upon which the
employer was relying, and alleged discrimination of the sort that the
“record of” prong might logically address, the case seemed to present a
perfect opportunity for the second prong to help root out intentional
discrimination.
Despite the timing of the events and the fact that the ADA’s
legislative history specifically envisions that an individual with a history
of a condition such as bipolar disorder would fall within the coverage of
the second prong,235 the applicant’s “record of” claim wound up being
decided on the grounds that she did not have such a record, not on the
employer’s motivation for its actions. Specifically, her past
hospitalization had been for only a short period of time and her condition
was being effectively treated by medication at the time she applied for
the position.236 Thus, the rules regarding hospitalizations, permanent or
long-term impacts, and the use of mitigating measures all combined to
prevent the applicant from reaching the jury in a situation where the
applicant had at least a decent argument that the employer’s decision to
withdraw its job offer was motivated by the applicant’s diagnosis of
bipolar disorder.

232. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
236. Horwitz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 357.
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F.

Other Problems with the Prima Facie Case

Establishing the existence of a disability is merely the first hurdle an
ADA plaintiff must overcome in order to establish a prima facie case.
Despite this Article’s focus on the difficulties associated with the
definition of a “record of” disability, it bears mentioning that there are
other potential drawbacks to asserting coverage under the second prong
that are unrelated to these difficulties.
One of the more interesting questions with regard to an ADA
plaintiff’s prima facie case is whether an employer must accommodate
an individual with a history of disability. In order to be protected by the
ADA, an individual with a disability must be qualified, i.e., capable of
performing, with or without reasonable accommodation, the essential
functions of the position such individual holds or desires.237 In the case
of an individual who has largely recovered from a once-substantially
limiting impairment, but who still has some limitations flowing from the
impairment, the individual might not be able to perform the essential
functions of the position without a reasonable accommodation.
Similarly, an individual who has largely recovered from a condition or
whose condition is controlled may nonetheless suffer an occasional
flare-up and be unable to perform the essential functions of a position
with reasonable accommodation.238 Yet, it remains an open question
under the ADA whether individuals who do not have a current, actual
disability are entitled to reasonable accommodation under the Act.239
G.

Summary

To recap, the number of instances in which a “record of” claim is
colorable under the ADA is, by its nature, quite small, based simply on
the fact that claims under the second prong only involve instances where
237. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
238. Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 509 n.6 (7th Cir. 1998).
239. See Martinez v. Cole Sewell Corp., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1132 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (holding
that individual with a record of disability is not entitled to a reasonable accommodation); see also
Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that requiring
employers to accommodate “record of” plaintiffs might raise similar concerns as raised in “regarded
as cases,” but declining to address the issue); Michele A. Travis, Leveling the Playing Field or
Stacking the Deck? The “Unfair Advantage” Critique of Perceived Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L.
REV. 901 (2000) (addressing the concern that requiring employers to provide reasonable
accommodations for perceived disability plaintiffs would result in an unfair advantage for such
individuals as compared to individuals with impairments who are not regarded by their employers
as being substantially limited in a major life activity).
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an individual had a once-disabling impairment or has been misclassified
as having a disability. There are almost no examples of individuals in the
latter category, so the protected class is, at the outset, made that much
smaller. In the former category of cases, the interpretation given by the
EEOC and the courts has resulted in a dramatic narrowing of the prong.
Many individuals cannot claim coverage under the “record of” prong
despite the fact that the ADA’s legislative history strongly suggests they
should be covered. Thus, the “record of” prong has fallen into a position
of neglect and disrepair within the ADA’s framework.
III. RESTORING THE “RECORD OF” PRONG
Despite the generally grim state of the “record of” prong, ADA
plaintiffs can and should rely on the prong more frequently. The
situation for ADA plaintiffs claiming coverage under the actual and
“regarded as” prongs is, of course, similarly grim.240 But at least with
respect to these two prongs, plaintiffs’ attorneys have not yet given up
the fight. In contrast, it appears that most plaintiffs’ attorneys see little
use in the “record of” prong. The problems with the “record of” prong—
and indeed the ADA’s entire definition of disability—are substantial
enough that they cannot fully be addressed without legislative
amendment. However, assuming that congressional action will not be
forthcoming in the near future,241 the task for plaintiffs’ attorneys is to
use more effectively those resources that already exist. In the following
Part, I offer some suggestions.
A.

History (Not Records): Focusing on an Individual’s History of
Impairment

Plaintiffs’ attorneys need to think of the “record of” prong less in
terms of records and more in terms of history. The second prong is not,
as some attorneys apparently believe, simply a repetition of the actual
disability prong but with the added requirement that a plaintiff possess a
tangible record that affirmatively notes the existence of a disability. As
the prohibitions regarding medical examinations and inquiries attests,
Congress certainly evinced concern over the mischief that might result
240. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
241. See William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 91, 95 (2003) (“The era of federal employment legislation as the predominant type
of employment law may be over—at least for a while.”).
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from employers reviewing “records” concerning physical or mental
impairments. However, the ADA’s legislative history makes clear that
Congress was at least as concerned about employers basing their
decisions on an individual’s history of impairment, regardless of whether
that history takes the form of a tangible record.242
Similarly, plaintiffs’ attorneys should reject any attempts to impose
any special evidentiary requirements regarding the presentation of actual
documents demonstrating the existence of a past disability. While
tangible records may be the most likely method of proof in establishing a
history of disability, nothing in the ADA’s text or legislative history
requires that such a history be documented.243 Nor is there any support
for the original view of the EEOC that an ADA plaintiff must establish
that an employer relied on the record in order to establish coverage
under the “record of” prong.244 Indeed, the federal courts’ pre-ADA
treatment of “record of” claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the
legislative history concerning the ADA’s “record of” prong actually, if
anything, better support the conclusion that such documentation is not
required.245 In short, the existence of a tangible record describing the
limiting effect of an individual’s impairment should not be the sine qua
non of a claim under the “record of” prong. By directing courts away
from the question of whether an employer relied on a record
documenting a disability and more toward what will often be the more
meaningful question of whether there is a verifiable history of disability,
plaintiffs’ attorneys may open somewhat the narrow window provided
by the “record of” prong.
B.

Use it (or Lose it): Making More Frequent Use of the “Record of”
Prong

The most obvious way that the “record of” prong could be revitalized
would be if plaintiffs’ attorneys would actually utilize the prong. Simply
put, better lawyering may produce better results. Admittedly, for the
reasons discussed throughout this Article, the number of instances in
which the “record of” may provide a viable alternative to coverage under
either of the other two prongs may be limited. Occasionally, however,

242. See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.

723

LONG

11/5/2006 1:09:07 PM

Washington Law Review

Vol. 81:669, 2006

there will be instances in which an ADA plaintiff may be able to slip in
between the cracks of the exclusionary rules regarding the actual and
perceived disability prongs and claim coverage under the “record of”
prong.246
1.

The “Record of” Prong as an Alternative to Coverage Under the
“Regarded as” Prong

At a minimum, plaintiffs’ attorneys should perhaps consider a stop at
the “record of” prong before proceeding directly to the “regarded as”
prong in cases involving individuals who do not currently have a
substantially limiting impairment. As originally conceived, the
“regarded as” prong was to be the fall-back where coverage was
unavailable under either of the first two prongs.247 Yet, plaintiffs’
attorneys are now far more likely to assert a perceived disability claim
than they are a “record of” claim.248 At least at the appellate level,
perceived disability plaintiffs have an equally low overall success rate
and have enjoyed virtually no success when the mitigating measures rule
is implicated.249 Perhaps, then, it is time to look elsewhere.
If interpreted properly, the “record of” prong does not present the
same challenges with regard to employer perceptions as does the
perceived disability prong. If the entirely unjustified burden of requiring
a plaintiff to establish that the employer relied on a documented history
of disability in order to obtain coverage under the “record of” prong is
eliminated, employer perceptions should be irrelevant to the simple
question of whether an individual has a history of an impairment that
once substantially limited a major life activity. In contrast, the “regarded
as” prong, by definition, requires some speculation into the mental state
of the defendant. By relying on the “record of” prong rather than the
“regarded as” prong, ADA plaintiffs can avoid the thorny question that
has sunk so many perceived disability claims—what beliefs did the
employer entertain about the nature of the plaintiff’s impairment?
Instead, ADA plaintiffs can focus on the more concrete issue of whether
a history of disability exists and rely on the “regarded as” prong only
246. See St. Onge v. Livingston County, No. 04-71329, 2005 WL 1838529 (E.D. Mich. July 29,
2005) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment on actual and perceived disability
claims, but denying it on plaintiff’s record of disability claim).
247. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 19 and accompanying fig.1.
249. See supra note 194 and accompanying fig.3.
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where they cannot claim coverage under either of the first two prongs. In
so doing, plaintiffs’ attorneys may relieve the “regarded as” prong of a
weight it does not appear equipped to carry and shift some of that load
onto the “record of” prong.
2.

Better Lawyering = Better Results

There are other instances in which ADA plaintiffs should be faring
better based on existing law but are being let down by their attorneys.
Now that it is well established that a mere diagnosis of an impairment is
insufficient to establish a record of disability,250 in many instances there
is little excuse for plaintiffs’ attorneys who fail to present a more
detailed evidentiary record of an ADA plaintiff’s medical history.251 Yet,
in numerous cases, plaintiffs proceeding under the “record of” prong
have watched their claims go down in defeat due to the failure to provide
evidence as to how the impairment in question limited the individual in
his or her daily life.252
Viewing the second prong in terms of history, rather than tangible
records, may also open up other possibilities for ADA plaintiffs who
may be thwarted by some of the other restrictive interpretations of the
definition of disability. For example, in Schneiker v. Fortis Insurance
Co.,253 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that an individual with
major depression did not have an actual disability. The court reasoned
that the plaintiff’s depression was triggered by working under her
supervisor.254 As a result, she was only precluded from working at this
particular job, not a class of jobs or broad range of jobs; thus, she did not
have an actual disability.255 However, according to the court’s opinion,
the individual had been diagnosed with depression and treated with

250. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002).
251. Admittedly, where plaintiffs are bound by the requirement that they must provide tangible
documentation of a substantially limiting impairment, it will be difficult in some instances to obtain
such records.
252. For example, in Starks-Umoja v. Fed. Express Corp., 341 F. Supp. 2d 979, 993 (W.D. Tenn.
2003), the plaintiff had been “under the care of various psychiatrists for a lengthy period of time”
and “was on disability leave from her job . . . for approximately five years.” These facts would seem
to establish a strong foundation for coverage under the “record of” prong. Yet the plaintiff lost on
summary judgment because all she did was submit evidence of her impairment, not how it
substantially limited her. Id.
253. 200 F.3d 1055 (7th Cir. 2000).
254. Id. at 1061.
255. Id.
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medication nearly five years prior to her discharge.256 She was
hospitalized for depression in a psychiatric hospital on three occasions
the following year and was released to an outpatient program, which she
attended for six months.257 Although there are no other details provided
by the court as to the plaintiff’s history of depression, it seems perfectly
reasonable to believe that she might have had a colorable claim under
the “record of” prong. However, no such claim was made on appeal or at
the trial court.258
More resourceful lawyering may also produce better results. In the
case of individuals who have employed corrective or mitigating devices
for extended periods of time, Sutton’s mitigating measures may not bar a
claim under the “record of” prong even where it might under the actual
disability prong. One frustrating tendency of ADA plaintiffs and courts
is to focus almost exclusively on recent medical history.259 Yet, nothing
about the second prong requires a recent history of a substantially
limiting impairment. By looking farther back in time, some plaintiffs
may see their prospects for success improve.
For example, in Lawson v. CSX Transportation, Inc.,260 the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a jury question existed as to whether
an individual who had been diagnosed with Type I insulin-dependent
diabetes at infancy had a record of disability. Despite the use of insulin,
the individual had had great difficulty throughout his life regulating his
blood sugar levels.261 As a child the plaintiff had been hospitalized
frequently.262 And while he had not been hospitalized for over a dozen
years at the time of the adverse employment action, he frequently had

256. Id. at 1058.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1060 n.1.
259. See Burrell v. Cummins Great Plains, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1015–16 (S.D. Iowa 2004)
(focusing on plaintiff’s medical problems during the relevant period of employment rather than on
medical problems occurring during plaintiff’s thirty-three year history of diabetes); Bennett v.
Calabrian Chems. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 2d 815, 819–20, 832 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (focusing on twentyseven-day period during which plaintiff was off work recovering from surgery rather than on
nineteen-month period during which plaintiff underwent three aortofemoral bypass surgeries and the
time prior to such surgeries); Smith v. Lattimore Materials, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 667, 669–71 (E.D.
Tex. 2003) (focusing on plaintiff’s recent work history in a case involving a plaintiff with a thirteenyear history of pain associated with a shoulder injury and a ten-year history of depression and
general anxiety).
260. 245 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2001).
261. Id. at 918.
262. Id.
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insulin reactions, including one fairly recent incident where he had lost
consciousness.263 In addition, the plaintiff’s difficulty in regulating his
blood sugar levels made it difficult for him to maintain employment, and
he was ultimately determined to be eligible for total disability benefits
by the Social Security Administration.264 These factors led the court to
conclude that a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff had a record
of disability.265
Even with the use of insulin, the plaintiff’s condition in Lawson was
severe enough that the court concluded that a jury question existed as to
whether the plaintiff had an actual disability.266 Therefore, the plaintiff
may not have needed the “record of” prong. However, many similarlysituated ADA plaintiffs will not have conditions that are presently as
severe as those of the plaintiff in Lawson. Yet, the fact that they were
diagnosed early in their lives or many years ago may mean that they
have experienced similar difficulties over the course of their lives, even
if they were not experiencing such difficulties at the time of the adverse
employment action. For example, an individual who takes medication
for epilepsy and who, as an adult, has experienced only infrequent
occurrences of petit mal seizures and no grand mal seizures may have a
difficult time claiming coverage under the actual disability prong.267
However, if one delves deeper into that individual’s medical history and
uncovers a history of grand mal seizures or greater frequency of petit
mal seizures during the individual’s younger years, the individual might
have a better chance at claiming disability status by relying on the
“record of” prong.268 Similarly, an individual who has largely recovered
from an impairment as a result of surgery or who is able to control the

263. Id.
264. Id. at 927.
265. Id. at 929.
266. Id. at 926.
267. See EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 353 (4th Cir. 2001) (concluding that individual
who had suffered infrequent occurrences of less severe forms of epileptic seizures did not have a
disability).
268. See Shaver v. Ind. Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 720 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that individual
who had suffered nocturnal epilepsy since he was a teenager, but had an operation to alleviate the
condition, had a record of disability). Cf. EEOC v. J.H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850 (6th Cir.
2001) (involving an individual who had taken medication for epilepsy since childhood but only
claimed coverage under the actual disability prong); Cooper v. Olin Corp., 246 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir.
2001) (involving an individual who had been diagnosed with depression nearly thirty years earlier
and who was taking medication to control the effects thereof, but who only claimed coverage under
the actual and perceived disability prongs).
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effects of an impairment through the use of corrective or mitigating
devices may nonetheless have undergone a prolonged recovery or
adjustment period, which might allow for coverage under the “record of”
prong.269
Reliance on the “record of” prong might be particularly promising in
situations in which an individual has learned to “self accommodate” to
the point that the individual no longer has an actual disability. For
example, in Emory v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP,270 a custodian
alleged discrimination based on his cerebral palsy.271 The plaintiff’s
actual disability claim was a close one because, through a combination
of “force of will, perseverance, and some learned accommodations,” the
plaintiff was able to perform a variety of manual tasks despite the
severity of his impairment.272 Relevant to the plaintiff’s claim was the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Albertson’s, which held that
mitigating measures, both in the form of “artificial aids, like medications
and devices,” as well as “measures undertaken, whether consciously or
not, with the body’s own systems” must be considered in evaluating
whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity.273
But learned accommodations, unlike medication or artificial devices,
may take a significant period of time before reducing the effect of an
impairment to the point that it is no longer substantially limiting. Indeed,
in Emory, the plaintiff’s struggle to learn to live with and selfaccommodate his cerebral palsy was a lifelong one.274 Given the

269. Cf. Otting v. J.C. Penney Co., 223 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2000) (involving individual diagnosed
with epilepsy seventeen years prior to the opinion and who continued to suffer seizures nine months
after undergoing brain surgery to correct the condition, but who only claimed coverage under the
actual disability prong); Little I, 147 S.W.3d 421, 422 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003), rev’d, 148 S.W.3d 374
(Tex. 2004) (involving individual who did not obtain a prosthetic leg for a year after shooting
accident and who needed a cane to walk for several years after being fitted with the prosthetic). See
generally Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2003) (involving
individual who underwent chemotherapeutic treatment for Hepatitis-C and underwent two surgeries
for carpal tunnel syndrome, but who only claimed coverage under the “regarded as” prong). While
such a history may establish coverage under the “record of” prong, ultimately a plaintiff still must
establish that the adverse employment decision was because of the individual’s history of
impairment.
270. 401 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2005).
271. Id. at 175.
272. Id. at 181.
273. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1999).
274. See Emory, 401 F.3d at 175–78 (describing plaintiff’s condition and his steps to selfaccommodate).
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plaintiff’s long history in dealing with the impairment, a “record of”
claim was arguably the more logical basis on which to proceed.275
Finally, the possibility that effective advocacy may help rescue the
“record of” prong and thereby restore some of the overall force to the
ADA’s broader definition of disability should not be discounted. The
battles over the mitigating measures, single-job, and permanent or longterm impact rules may have been fought and lost in the context of the
actual and perceived disability prongs, but to date the arguments in favor
of more expansive coverage under the “record of” prong largely remain
untried and untested. By asserting coverage under the “record of” prong
in certain instances, ADA plaintiffs may force courts to confront some of
the bizarre results produced if some of the U.S. Supreme Court’s more
controversial holdings on the actual and perceived disability prongs are
applied to the “record of” prong.
Since Sutton, there have been virtually no mitigating measures cases
brought under the “record of” prong in which the federal appellate courts
have engaged in any meaningful discussion of the role of the “record of”
prong. By asserting coverage under the second prong in the case of
treatable or “cured” impairments, ADA plaintiffs may provoke
defendants to raise arguments based upon Sutton or Toyota Motor
Manufacturing. Rather than fearing such a response, plaintiffs’ attorneys
should use such responses as an opportunity to force courts to confront
the legislative intent behind the “record of” prong and some of the
potentially bizarre consequences that might follow if the holdings from
those cases are applied literally in the “record of” disability context. At a
minimum, increased use of the second prong and better lawyering in the
pursuit of claims brought under that prong may lead to clearer standards.
For example, the most logical course of action for a court would be to
simply reject application of the permanent or long-term impact rule from
Toyota Motor Manufacturing in the case of a “record of” claim and to
rely upon the EEOC’s three-factor approach, in which the permanent or
long-term impact resulting from the impairment is simply one factor to
consider.276
At least one court has suggested in the context of a “record of” case
decided after Toyota Motor Manufacturing that “the words ‘record’ and

275. The plaintiff lost at the summary judgment stage at the trial court, but the appellate court
reversed on the actual disability issue. Id. at 183. The court did not, however, address the plaintiff’s
“record of” claim. Id. at 183 n.6.
276. See supra note 51–52 and accompanying text.
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‘history’ could indicate that the impairment [need not be] long-term or
permanent.”277 At a minimum, there is a strong argument that requiring
the existence of a permanent impact would essentially render the “record
of” prong a nullity in light of the fact that the prong was specifically
designed to cover those individuals who had recovered from a once
disabling impairment.278 At the same time, ADA plaintiffs who have
invested considerable time, money, and energy in overcoming the effects
of impairments may be more likely to persuade courts to adopt a lower
threshold for what qualifies as a long-term impairment.
C.

Stateward Ho!(?): State Law as an Alternative to the ADA

Finally, plaintiffs’ attorneys should not discount the possibility of a
remedy under state law. Nearly every state has a statute prohibiting
employment discrimination against individuals with disabilities.279 It
might be difficult in the face of more than twelve years worth of adverse
authority to convince the federal courts to suddenly interpret the “record
of” prong in the most logical manner and the manner in which it was
intended to be interpreted. However, there is considerably less disability
discrimination precedent at the state level. And while many state courts
have simply decided to adopt the approach of the federal courts when
interpreting their own statutes,280 a handful have been willing to buck the
federal trend and have shown themselves to be more receptive to the
types of policy and legislative history arguments the U.S. Supreme
Court has thus far rejected.281
Viewing the “record of” prong as being concerned with the question
of whether an individual has a history of a once-disabling impairment
rather than being solely focused on the question of whether the
individual can establish that an employer relied upon a tangible record
documenting the existence of an impairment potentially frees up
plaintiffs’ attorneys to rely more frequently upon the “record of” prong.
This focus on history may also open up other avenues by which
plaintiffs can bypass some of the restrictive approaches the federal
courts have applied to the ADA’s definition of disability. And while at
277. Lloyd v. E. Cleveland City Sch. Dist., 232 F. Supp. 2d 806, 812 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
278. See supra note 43–44 and accompanying text.
279. Long, supra note 27, at 628.
280. Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: Divergent Interpretations of State
and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 469, 483 (2006).
281. See generally id. at 539–50.
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least some battles over the meaning of the “record of” prong may not be
worth fighting at the federal level, state courts may, in some instances,
be more receptive to some of the logical arguments in favor of a more
permissive reading of at least the “record of” portion of the ADA’s
definition of disability.
CONCLUSION
What happened to the “record of” prong is, in some ways,
symptomatic of what happened to the Americans with Disabilities Act
more generally. At present, the “record of” prong is the forgotten aspect
of the ADA. To some extent, plaintiffs’ attorneys who forsake reliance
on the second prong can hardly be blamed for not pursuing this avenue.
Congress, the EEOC, and the federal courts limited the potential of the
prong before it was ever fully explored. For example, the failure of
Congress to employ a categorical approach with respect to the “record
of” prong that would classify individuals with histories of certain kinds
of impairments as having disabilities has limited the reach of the “record
of” prong. The requirement that a plaintiff must establish that an
employer relied on a tangible record documenting the existence of a
disability has likewise hindered “record of” plaintiffs. And the federal
courts’ restrictive approach with respect to the ADA’s overall definition
of disability has had dramatic consequences for plaintiffs proceeding
under the “record of” prong.
Despite these difficulties, the “record of” prong does have some role
to play in combating discrimination against individuals with disabilities.
If interpreted properly by the courts and asserted more frequently by
plaintiffs’ attorneys, the prong has the potential to at least occasionally
allow plaintiffs to cross the “demanding threshold” established by the
U.S. Supreme Court. Of course, establishing the existence of a disability
hardly insures victory. An ADA plaintiff who establishes the existence
of a disability still must run the gauntlet of establishing that he or she is
qualified for the position, and that the employer actually discriminated
on the basis of disability. However, given the enormous difficulties
ADA plaintiffs often have in meeting the threshold requirement that they
qualify as disabled, resort to the “record of” prong may give more ADA
plaintiffs a fighting chance. Thus, at a minimum, resort to the “record
of” prong may open doors for ADA plaintiffs that have previously been
closed. In theory, the “record of” prong has a role to play in combating
discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Through more
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resourceful and aggressive lawyering, plaintiffs’ attorneys may yet be
able to restore some vitality to this once-promising component of the
ADA.
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